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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Commission drafted the Sentencing
Guidelines in accord with congressional instructions in order to assure
that guidelines and policy statements were entirely neutral as to sex.'
As a result, the Guidelines explicitly mandate that sex is not relevant in
the determination of a sentence.2 However, such legislated equality pos-
es difficulties for many women whose criminal behavior and history, as
well as family responsibilities, cannot easily be shoehorned into a puni-
tive pro-prison model for sentencing males assumed to be violent
and/or major drug dealers. For example, female offenders are often
mothers who have sole or primary responsibility for the care of their
children, a consideration virtually ignored by the current Guidelines.
Many women who are sentenced, particularly in drug conspiracies, are
the wives or girlfriends of male defendants who have fathered their
children. They may find themselves involved in criminal activity be-
cause of social and cultural pressures or occasionally as a result of
1. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1992).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.10 (1992) (policy state-
ment) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
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more obvious means of coercion such as battering. Harsh mandatory
minimums combined with the inflexible Guidelines regime result in
lengthy incarceration of such women whose actual role in drug cases is
often quite limited. Similarly, although property offenses, which consti-
tute a significant percentage of female crime, result in lower average
sentences than other types of offenses, Guidelines sentencing requires
some incarceration for women who pre-Guidelines would have been
sentenced to straight probation.
This Article reviews the criminological literature concerning female
offenders and pre-Guidelines sentencing disparity in order to better de-
termine the effect of the Guidelines in current sentencing practice? A
large amount of statistical data pertaining to women offenders is incor-
porated both to paint a portrait of those who have been caught up by
the criminal justice system and to evaluate differences in pre- and
3. I chose to use the term "sentencing disparity" interchangeably with "prefer-
ential" or "differential" sentencing, even though disparity can more narrowly refer to
a pattern of unlike sentences for like offenders. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring
Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 933 (1990). The reason for treating these terms broadly is that the
literature usually focuses on whether women obtain better sentencing results, without
engaging in multivariate analysis to determine whether such preference is due to gen-
der disparity or can be justified by other factors. Even the more sophisticated stud-
ies, which attempt to control for prior criminal history and/or offense characteristics,
rarely control for caretaking responsibilities of the males and females being studied.
See infra notes 46-51, 133-43 and accompanying text.
As a practical matter, information that would enable such analyses is often lack-
ing in public records. This is true even in the Guidelines regime. In providing sen-
tencing information to the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Phyllis Newton,
Staff Director of the Sentencing Commission commented:
While we have provided information on the number of dependents, we are
unable to differentiate one type of dependent from another (e.g., child from
spouse). As well, we are unable to identify whether a defendant was a single
parent or was living with dependent children prior to sentencing. Our defini-
tion of dependents may limit the usefulness of these tables for your analyses.
Letter from Phyllis Newton, Staff Director, United States Sentencing Commission, to
Professor Myrna Raeder at 2 (May 26, 1992) (on file with author). I appreciate being
given permission by Ms. Newton, to use the letter and accompanying 1991 data in this
Article [hereinafter May 26, 1992 SC Reponses]. I also wish to thank the Commission
for updating some of this material to include 1992 data [hereinafter March 17, 1993 SC
Responses] (on file with author).
In retrospect, it is not surprising that this information is not currently obtainable,
since the Guidelines assume that family information is typically of little or no value in
sentencing decisions. However, such absence makes it more difficult to examine gender
questions raised in guidelines sentencing.
post-Guidelines sentencing. Since gender information is often difficult
to ascertain, some of the data is fairly general. To the extent possible,
the Article examines statistics which highlight trends before and after
1989. However, I recognize that the Guidelines should not be viewed in
isolation, but as an extention of an ongoing effort favoring more puni-
tive sentencing
My thesis is that the Guidelines, which are designed to reduce race,
class and other unwarranted disparities in sentencing males, ignores
factors that are integral to the lives of many female offenders.4 Ironical-
ly, the downplaying of family and community ties in order to ensure
that indigent minority males were not disadvantaged in sentencing re-
sulted in women being sentenced more harshly than previously. Treat-
ing men and women fungibly for sentencing purposes overlooks the
role played by gender in criminality. While some courts creatively inter-
pret the Guidelines to avoid Draconian results, it is time to recognize
sex-based anomalies in sentencing. Where necessary, courts should
modify the Guidelines to encourage single parenting departures. Preg-
nancy and primary parenting responsibilities should also be grounds for
discretionary departures. The objective should not merely be to mete
out equal sentences to females, but rather to guarantee that they re-
4. This essay focuses solely on female offenders. Questions about gender sensi-
tivity in guidelines practice also arise concerning female victims. For example, in
1991, the Basic Rape Sentence for violation of § 18 U.S.C. 2242 (Supp. 1992), pro-
duced a guidelines sentence of 5.8 years. Guideline sentences for robbery, kidnapping
and even relatively minor drug offenses have higher base times or mandatory mini-
mums. While many stranger-rape encounters produce a higher sentence due to the
presence of other factors such as weapons or kidnapping, the 5.8-year average ap-
plied to most acquaintance rapes. Therefore, a subtle message may be sent that
acquaintance rape is not a significant offense in comparison to other crimes. See
NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORT: PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION DRAFr 163
(1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
In addition, gender expectations can intrude upon sentencing departure issues.
For example, in United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991), a trial
judge denied a request for a downward departure from a conviction of aggravated
sexual abuse where the male defendant claimed that he and the victim smoked crack
together and she was reputed to exchange sex for drugs. The court appropriately
recognized that the law protects all people. Similarly, gender roles can be implicated
when determining whether a prostitute is a vulnerable victim. Compare United States
v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming an upward adjustment) with
United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 1991) (reversing an upward
adustment).
Recognition of differing gender effects can be seen in United States v. Newman,
965 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1992). In Newman, an adult woman who had been sexu-
ally abused as a child was found to be a vulnerable victim of a fraud committed by
a male who had entered a romantic relationship with her. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Seventh Circuit relied on articles indicating the susceptibility of such women
to sexual exploitation as adults.
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ceive just sentences which reflect their dissimilar patterns of criminality
and family responsibilities. Currently, the lofty goal of gender neutrality
has backfired, wreaking havoc in the lives of female offenders and their
children who are forgotten by the Sentencing Guidelines structure. I
also call for the establishment of a federal task force focusing on fe-
male offenders so that a rational sentencing policy concerning women
can be created and integrated into the Guidelines structure. In addition,
the task force would consider appropriate programs and facilities for
sentenced women and their families. Finally, I join the chorus of voices
urging reconsideration of the severe sentences dictated by mandatory
minimum drug statutes.
II. WHO ARE FEMALE OFFENDERS?
Society has always viewed female offenders as an aberration.5 Dating
from at least the mid-eighteenth century, women have comprised a
much smaller percentage of criminal offenders than their percentage of
the general population.' Traditional theories of female criminality fo-
cused on the whore/madonna distinction, which assumed that some
women were destined to be evil and others to be placed upon pedes-
tals.7 With the advent of the women's movement, attention shifted from
the traditional approach to predicting the effects of "women's libera-
tion." Criminologists began to recognize that socialization of women
dating from childhood, rather than biology, was the reason for their
relative absence in crimes other than property offenses! A few com-
5. Overviews of theories concerning female criminality include Meda Chesney-Lind,
Women and Crime: The Female Offender, 12 SIGNS 78 (1986) [hereinafter, Chesney-
Lind, Women and Crime], Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Crim-
inology, 5 JUST. Q. 497 (1988), and JOCELYN M. POLLOCK-BYRNE, WOMEN, PRISON &
CRIME ch. 2 (1990).
6. Unexpectedly, some empirical evidence depicts women offenders as being much
more prevalent in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, committing a substantial
portion of all felony offenses. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Deborah L. Little, The Van-
ishing Female: The Decline of Women in the Criminal Process, 1687-1912, 25 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 719, 732, 750 (1991). See also N.E.H. HULL, FEMALE FELONS: WOMEN AND
SERIOUS CRIME IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 67 (1987).
7. See generally KAREN DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE (1974); Dorie Klein, The Etiology
of Female Crime: A Review of the Literature in WOMEN, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 65
(Susan K Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds., 1980).
8. See generally D. Hoffman-Bustamante, The Nature of Female Criminality, 8
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 117 (1973). More recently this has evolved into a power-con-
trol theory, which focuses on parental controls and attitudes towards risk-taldng. See
mentators envisioned large numbers of females being lured to a life of
crime either because of greater opportunity' or the desire to mimic
male behavior. The anticipated increase of violent crime by women
never materialized." While property and drug offenses have soared,'"
this has not been attributed to the women's movement, but rather to
the 'feminization of poverty."'
The obvious factor to which criminologists now attribute most female
misconduct is economic marginalization." Certainly, the $687 average
monthly income of federally sentenced female defendants supports the
importance of this theory in analyzing female crime. Generally, "it is
John Hagan & Fiona Kay, Gender and Delinquency in White-Collar Families: A Pow-
er-Control Perspective, 36 CRIME & DEUNQ. 391 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Rita J. Simon, Women and Crime Revisited, 56 Soc. Sc. Q. 658, 661
(1976).
10. See, e.g., FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMI-
NAL 15 (1975).
11. Statistics describing 1989 federal prison admissions classify only 3.5% of federal
crimes committed by females as violent, compared to 8.296 of male federal offenses.
CRAIG PERIaNS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING
PROGRAM, 1989 Table 5-2 at 53 (1992) [hereinafter BJS, 1989]. Moreover, men were
responsible for 95.2% of all violent offense committed by people admitted to federal
prison in 1989. ld., Table ,5-4 at 55. See also Roland Chilton & Susan K Datesman,
Gender, Race, and Crime: An Analysis of Urban Arrest Trends, 1960-1980, 1 GEN-
DER & SOC'Y 152, 153-54 (1987).
One interesting fact emerges from the fiscal year 1991 and 1992 federal sen-
tencing data concerning manslaughter, a relatively infrequent category of federal crime
due to jurisdictional restrictions. Women were responsible for 10 manslaughters, or
1796 of all manslaughters in 1991. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNU-
AL REPORT Table 17. In 1992, females committed 22% of all manslaughters. UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 13. All Sentencing Com-
mission data is based on the fiscal year that spans October to September, whether or
not otherwise specifically noted in this Article. While these numbers are too small to
be significant, they raise the specter that even in federal court, some women's vio-
lence is actually imperfect self defense or a failed Battered Woman's Syndrome
defense.
12. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Gloria Leventhal, Female Criminality: Is 'Women's Lib' to Blame? 41
PSYCHOL REP. 1179 (1977) (finding that the female inmates had much more traditional
views than the control group of college students). See also CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN
IN THE .CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26-28 (1986). Professor Feinman concludes that any
link between the women's movement and female criminality is unrealistic, particularly
since the demographics of female prisoners, who are often poor uneducated minority
women, has little in common with the typical portrait of the white middle or upper
class feminist.
14. See, e.g., Chilton & Datesman, supra note 11, at 167-68.
15. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Appendix B (con-
taining national data and demographic information on sentenced defendants). Female
income was 87% of that for male sentenced defendants. Similarly, a nationwide sur-
vey of female offenders found that 6096 received welfare. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL
[Vol. 20: 905, 19931 Federal Sentencing Guidelines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the absence, rather than the availability of employment opportunity for
women [that] seems to lead to increases in female crime."" Economic
marginalization is consistent with social control theory, which predicts
that as women have less daily informal social control in their lives due
to their growing representation in the labor market and as heads of
households, increasing numbers will enter the criminal court system.7
Economic marginalization also helps to explain the 'continuing high
percentage of female property crime," particularly among urban non-
White women.' Indeed, one study of urban larceny crimes found that
ASSOCIATION, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 7 (1990)
[hereinafter ACA].
Obviously, economic marginalization should be viewed as only a partial explana-
tion for criminality, since the vast numbers of law-abiding citizens who are poor belie
any suggestion that poverty dooms a person to a life of crime.
16. NGAIRE NAFFINE, FEMALE CRIME: THE CONSTRUCTION OF WOMEN IN CRIMINOLOGY
98 (1987), quoted in RrrA J. SIMON & JEAN LANDIS, THE CRIMES WOMEN COMMIT, THE
PUNISHMENTs THEY RECEIVE 9 (1991).
17. Candace Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime, and Dependency, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 495,
609 (1982). See also PAT CARLEN, WOMEN, CRIME AND POVERTY 112-14 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Gender and Varieties of White Collar Crime, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 769, 790 (1989). One possible reason for increasing theft statistics may
relate to the growing willingness of storeowners to prosecute for larceny crimes. See,
e.g., FEINmAN, supra note 13, at 29.
Property crimes accounted for 32.8% of all crimes committed by women who
were admitted to federal prison in 1989 in comparison to 18.1% of crimes committed
by men. BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Table 5-2 at 53. Even in relationship to total
crime, women committed a significant number of such crimes as embezzlement
(42.5%), forgery (25.9%) and larceny (20.2%), given that they constituted only 10.6% of
offenders. See id., Table 5-4 at 55.
Sentencing statistics from October 1990 through September 1992 confirm this
trend. Although women comprised just 16.7% of those sentenced in federal court in
fiscal year 1.991, they were responsible for 31.1% of larcenies, 27.996 of frauds, 60.996
of embezzlements and 16.6% of forgeries/counterfeitings. Moreover, these offenses
accounted for 4896 of female crimes, compared with 19% of male crimes and 24% of
all federal crimes. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT
Table 17. Similarly, in fiscal 1992 females' respective shares of property crimes were
32.8f, 26.2%, 58.6% and 23.4%, constituting 48% of crimes committed by women,
compared to 2096 of male offenses. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992
ANNUAL REPORT 47 & Table 13.
19. Chilton & Datesman, supra note 11, at 166-68.
Information from the Federal Bureau of Prisons tabulating offenses by sex and
race shows that in fiscal year 1988, property, extortion, fraud and bribery offenses
constituted 32.4% of crimes for which Black females were incarcerated and 23.6% of
crimes for which White females were imprisoned. Comparative statistics for 1989
were 27.796 and 18.6%, respectively. While property crimes decreased as a cause of
non-White women and White men had similar larceny arrest rates. Fur-
thermore, the study indicates that more than seventy-five percent of the
total increase in female larceny arrests from 1960 to 1980 was the result
of increased arrests of non-White women." Similarly, economic
marginalization can provide a partial rationale for the -relative rise of
drug offenses committed by women who have few employment skills,
although drugs can also be considered a separate cause of crime. Drug
offenders now account for a significant portion of female federal crime.
From January 1989 through September 1990, thirty-nine percent of
women sentenced under the Guidelines had committed drug offenses,
as compared with nearly fifty percent of sentenced males.' Moreover,
in January 1993, sixty-eight percent of federal female inmates were in-
carcerated for drug offenses.'
To date, not enough attention has been given to the realities of
women's lives in evaluating their criminality. For example, the recogni-
tion that women offenders often get into trouble because of their asso-
ciations with men," has not adequately been addressed.' Many fe-
incarceration because of the influx of drug offenses, in both years property crimes
accounted for nearly 996 more of the Black female inmate population than of the
White female inmate population. See OFFENSE BY SEX AND RACE FOR BUREAU OF
PRISONS DESIGNATED POPULATION ONLY, FY 1988 Table 15 (on file with the author);
OFFENSE BY SEX AND RACE FOR BUREAU OF PRISONS DESIGNATED POPULATION ONLY, FY
1989 Table 15 (on Mile with author).
20. Chilton & Datesman, supra note 11, at 158-60.
21. Drug offenses comprised 44.5% of all offenses for which women were admitted
to federal prison in 1989. The comparative percentage for male drug offenses was
only 39.696 BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Table 5-2 at 53. The higher drug incarceration
rate for women probably reflects differences between male and female crime pat-
terns. Men are typically incarcerated in large numbers for violent crimes as well as
drugs, while the percentage of violent crimes for female offenders is quite low.
Property crimes constitute the other major offense grouping that results in female
imprisonment. However, the Guidelines provide more flexibility in property sentencing
than in drug sentencing.
22. See I UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IM-
PACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE-
TION AND PLEA BARGAINING Table 7 at 58 (December 1991) [hereinafter DECEMBER
1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT]. The statistics from fiscal years 1991 and 1992
are only slightly less bleak. In 1991, drugs accounted for 3696 of female federal
sentencings, and 4796 of male federal sentencings. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table 17. In 1992, drug offenses comprised 34% of
female federal sentencings and 46% of male federal sentencings. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 13.
23. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, JANUARY
1993 CHARACTERISTICS OF INMATES IN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Source Sentry
Extract Files (January 9, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS] (on file
with author).
24. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 13, at 26. See infra notes 450-518 and accom-
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male offenders become involved in criminal behavior when they run
away from home to escape family abuse or neglect and discover that
life on the streets involves prostitution and petty theft.' Profiles of fe-
male offenders which focus primarily on state prisoners are generally
disheartening." A recent national survey of approximately 2000 female
offenders found that one third had been sexually abused, nearly thirty
percent had attempted suicide, more than fifty percent came from a
single parent or broken home, fifty percent came from families in which
a family member had been incarcerated, and most were drug users.'
Further, approximately eighty percent of the female adults had chil-
dren, about seventy percent of offenders with children were teen-age
mothers, sixty-two percent were single mothers,' and fifty-seven per-
cent were non-White.3 Similarly, in 1980 the a typical incarcerated fe-
panying text discussing the fact that many reported federal criminal decisions involv-
ing women mention the involvement of male intimates.
25. Obviously, feminists may justly fear that recognizing the importance of such
behavior reinforces stereotypical thinking about female offenders. However, patterns
of socialization that are ingrained in our society cannot be dismissed by wishful
thinking. Rather, recognition should lead to questions about whether and how society
can evolve attitudes about appropriate male/female relationships. In the meantime,
this article is a pragmatic attempt to address sentencing policy for female offenders
within the current social structure.
26. Chesney-Lind, Women and Crime, supra note 5, at 87. See generally, Kathleen
Daly, Women's Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of Law Breaking and
Problems of Representation, 2 U.S.C. REv. OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 11 (1992);
Lisa Maher, Reconstructing the Female Crimina: Women and Crack Cocaine, 2
U.S.C. REV. OF LAw AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 131 (1992); Tracy Thomburg & Diane
Trunk, A Collage of Voices: A Dialogue with Women in Prison, 2 U.S.C. REV. OF LAW
AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 155 (1992).
27. While there are similarities between the backgrounds of many male and female
offenders, gender must be factored into any explanation of female criminality. For
example, dissimilar gender patterns exist concerning physical and sexual victimization,
socialization, single parenting, offenses committed, and economic opportunities. As a
result, how females become criminals and the types of crimes they commit differ
significantly from the male model of criminality. See generally Meda Chesney-Lind,
Girl's Crime and Woman's Place: Toward a Feminist Model of Female Delinquency,
35 CRIME & DEuNQ. 5, 21-26 (1989), and articles cited in note 26.
28. ACA, supra note 15, at 6.
29. The former Chief of the Female Offender Section of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons also estimated that 8096 of women inmates are single parents. Ann d'Anteuil
Bartolo, A Journey to Understanding and Change, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 15 (Spring,
1992).
30. See ACA, supra note 15, at 6-7, 50-51.
31. Id. at 50-51.
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male was a young, poor, unsidiled, unmarried mother, who was a mem-
ber of a minority group and had committed a drug-related or property
crime.' A recent survey of more than 440 incarcerated mothers
showed less than twenty percent were married, more than sixty-five
percent were a member of-a minority group, sixty-five percent regularly
used drugs or alcohol, sixty-five percent were not employed, only nine
percent had an annual income of over $25,000, and at some time in
their lives fifty-three percent had been physically abused and forty-two
percent had been sexually abused.' Even federal data shows that 21.9
percent of women compared to 4.8 percent of men had been physically
or sexually abused.' While 73.2 percent of male abuse was solely phys-
ical, only 28.3 percent of female abuse was solely physical.' In other
words, a number of female offenders have been victims of sexual or
physical abuse as well as of an economic system that undervalues
women's labor, maling it difficult to support themselves if they have
small children.' Since victimized women tend to have low self-esteem
and view the world more pessimistically," poverty, racism, and sexual
discrimination may propel a number of them into criminal behavior. TM
Yet these factors are only now beginning to be integrated into any uni-
fied theory of female crime.'
32. See FEINMAN, su8p?- note 13, at 39 (citing U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, WOMEN
IN PRISON: INEQUITABLE TREATMENT REQUIRES ACTION 3-4 (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1980). A 1980 profile of 75 mothers incarcerated in county jails corresponded
with this description. ANN M. STANTON, WHEN MOTHERS Go TO JAIL 119 (1980).
33. BARBARA BLOOM & DAVID STEINHART, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME.AND DELUN-
QUENCY, WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? 20-22 (1993).
34. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation Table 5 (April
27, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter April 27, 1993 BOP Responses]. I par-
ticularly appreciated the Bureau's tabulating the responses to survey questions which
were relevant to this Article. These are preliminary results of a 1991 representative
sample of the federal prison population.
35. Id., Table 6.
36. POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 25. See generally Meda Chesney-Lind & Noelie
Rodriguez, Women Under Lock and Key: A View from the Inside, 63 PRISON J. 47
(1983).
37. Crista Brett, The Cycle Prom Victim to Victimizer, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 59, 62
(1992); see United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1992).
38. Chesney-Lind, Women and Crime, supra note 5, at 93-94.
39. Pat Carlen, in WOMEN, CRIME AND POVERTY (1988) reflects that early imprison-
ment of young women minimizes their future opportunities to enter traditional eco-
nomic and social relationships. Since such women "perceive themselves as being
marginalized and therefore, having nothing to lose, [they] decide that law-breaking is
a preferable alternative to poverty and social isolation." Id. at 13. While her work is
based on English and Scottish female offenders, it appears relevant in an American
setting. According to Professor Meda Chesney-Lind, gender, race and class play spe-
cial roles in the lives of women swept into the criminal justice system that must be
factored into a theory transcending simple profiles of offenders. Patriarchy, Prisons,
[Vol. 20: 905, 1993] Federal Sentencing Guidelines
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It may be that the 'feminization of poverty,'in combination with the
relative hopelessness of their lives is largely responsible for the increas-
ing number of female offenders who are single mothers.' Undoubted-
ly, single mothers are disproportionately an impoverished group. For
example, recent census statistics concerning poverty describe a 35.6
percent poverty rate for single female householders compared to a six
percent poverty rate for married-couple families.' The effect is more
dramatic for Black and Hispanic single mothers than for White single
mothers, with 51.2 percent, 49.7 percent and 28.4 percent of those
mothers, respectively, falling below the poverty level.' This Article will
later focus on the challenge to equitable sentencing posed by single
mothers who are trapped by a Guidelines regime based upon a male
model of sentencing. The objective of eliminating unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparity resulted in guidelines that concentrate primarily on the
offense and the offender's prior criminal history, while discounting oth-
er offender characteristics such as motivations, family obligations and
amenability to rehabilitation.' By robbing single mothers of the chance
to have judges sentence them based on narratives which fully portray
the contexts of their lives, the Guidelines often needlessly disrupt the
lives of their children."
and Jails: A Critical Look at Trends in Women's Incarceration, 71 PRISON J. 51, 64
(1991) [hereinafter Trends in Women's Incarceration]. For a detailed analysis of the
criminalization of women offenders, see Kathleen Daly, Women's Pathways to Felony
Court. Feminist Theories of Law Breaking and Problems of Representation, 2 U.S.C.
REV. OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 11 (1992).
40. See POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 3, 24; SIMON & LANDIS, supra note 16, at
10; see also Chilton & Datesman, supra note 11, at 167.
41. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME SERIES P-60, No. 181, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
1991 Table 1 at 1.
42. Id.
43. For a discussion of the history and purpose of the Guidelines see generally
Nagel, supra note 3.
44. Much literature concerning feminist jurisprudence has focused on narratives
and the importance of context in women's lives. Not surprisingly, the Guidelines grid,
which attempts to fit all offenders into the same Procrustean bed without regard to
the characteristics defining their individuality, poses significant difficulty for female of-
fenders whose lives are shaped by their gender roles and expectations. Obviously,
male offenders are also depersonalized by the grid, but females are defined by their
relationships to a much larger extent than are males in our current social structure.
III. DID FEMALE OFFENDERS RECEIVE PREFERENTIAL SENTENCING
BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDELINES?
Historically, women have always been perceived as obtaining prefer-
ential treatment at sentencing, which affected both the nature and
length of their sentences. However, little interest existed in studying
female sentencing until well into the 1970s when feminists began to
analyze the reasons for such disparity." Surprisingly, the empirical re-
search which was undertaken about sentencing disparity did not yield
consistent results. In her 1983 review of the then existing literature,
Professor Ilene H. Nagel, who is a currently a member of the United
States Sentencing Commission, concluded that to the extent there is
any preferential treatment, females benefit from favorable sentencing,
and that preferential treatment appears more pronounced in the least
severe sentencing options.' However, while the effect of gender was
demonstrably present, it was small relative to other factors such as the
statutory seriousness of the charged offense, and the existence of a pri-
or criminal record.47 The meager research discussing gender as a sen-
tencing factor in federal courts supports this proposition.'
Later published empirical data also reaches varying results. One state
study found that women received shorter sentences for felonies even
when men and women had comparable backgrounds, but the study did
not analyze parenting responsibilities." Another review of state prac-
tice concluded that although women received differential sentencing
from men, sex was not a powerful predictor of outcome and accounted
45. Several thorough, informative reviews of female sentencing literature exist
including Ilene H. Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and
Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE 91 (Michael Tonry & Norval
Morris eds., 1983) [hereinafter Offense Patterns], Lola Odubekun, A Structural Ap-
proach to Differential Gender Sentencing, 29 WL CRIM. JUST. ABsTRAcT 343 (1992),
and Sally S. Simpson, Feminist Theory, Crime and Justice, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 605
(1989).
46. Offense Patterns, supra note 45, at 129, 132.
47. Id, at,134.
48. See John Hagan et al., The Differential Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in
Ten Federal District Courts, 45 Am. Soc. REV. 802 (1980) (finding that while gender
was not critical, it remained a factor in sentencing after controlling for other .vari-
ables). See also DAVID WEISBURD, STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING AND NANCY BODE,
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 132 (1991) (based on the data originally used in
Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd and Nancy Bode, Sentencing the White Collar
Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AMER. Soc. REV. 641 (1942)).
49. Matthew Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Differential Sentencing of Women and
Men in the U.S.A., 12 INT'L J. OF THE SOC. OF LAW 401, 410 (1984). All sentences of
selected felonies and misdemeanors committed in North Carolina from 1969 through
1977 were studied. ld.
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for only 1.2 percent of the variance, even without any controls for vari-
ables such as prior record and the presence and ages of children.'
Thus, while pre-Guidelines sentencing practices clearly identify gender
as a reason for preferential sentencing, the effect of this factor was un-
clear." Moreover, isolating the effect of other variables which are more
prevalent in a female population, such as sole or primary caretaling
responsibility for young children, might have eliminated any perceived
disparity based solely on gender.
Given that the commentators did not agree about the extent to which
gender-based sentencing disparity existed, it was predictable that no
single justification would emerge to explain its cause. Early attention
focused on concepts of chivalry' and paternalism' as reasons for the
disparity. Chivalry refers to protectiveness by male judges who wish to
50. William Wilbanks, Are Female Felons Treated More Leniently by the Criminal
Justice System? 3 JUST. Q. 516, 521, 528 (1986). Over 180,000 felonies processed by
California criminal courts in 1980 were examined from arrest to sentencing. Id. at
520.
51. See generally Kathleen Daly, Gender, Race and Discrimination Research: Dispa-
rate Meanings of Statistical "Sex" and "Race Effects" in Sentencing (1991) (unpub-
lished ms., Dept. of Soc. University of Michigan) (on file with author). Professor Daly
reviewed 50 statistical studies of which 26 show "sex effects" favoring women. Of 38
studies controlling for prior record, 17 show such differences. ld. at 1. However, she
notes that a statistical study finding sex effects may not be indicative of discrimina-
tion against men. Id. at 24. In other words, the character of social offense, previous
law-breaking, and support and care for others is gendered and should make a differ-
ence in sentencing. Id. at 22.
52. See generally Etta Anderson, The Chivalrous Treatment of the Female Offender
in the Arms of the Criminal Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 23 Soc.
PROBs. 350 (1976).
53. Stuart S. Nagel & Lenore J. Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
171, 173 (1971). See also Christy Visher, Gender, Police Arrest Decisions and Notions
of Chivalry, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6 (1983).
Paternalism does not necessarily dictate leniency. Professor Meda Chesney-Lind
has written extensively about female juveniles who are detained more frequently than
males for status crimes because of judicial paternalism. See, e.g., Meda Chesney-Lind,
Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender: Training Women to Know
Their Place, 23 CRIME AND DELINQ. 121 (1977); Chesney-Lind, Women and Crime,
supra note 5, at 78. In 1987, girls were still more likely than boys to be confined for
status offenses and less serious delinquency. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Federal Juvenile
Justice Policy and the Incarceration of Girls, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 503, 513-15 (1990).
Similarly, in the past the use of indeterminate sentencing statutes resulted in longer
female incarceration in order to rehabilitate women. Elizabeth F. Moulds, Chivalry
and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal Justice System, in
WOMEN, CRIME AND JUSTICE 277, 283 (Susan Datesman & Frank Scarpitti eds., 1980).
save women from the harsh reality of prison and who assume that
women are weaker, less responsible for their crimes, and more easily
rehabilitated than men." The concept of paternalism is less precise,'
but views the motivation for preferential female sentencing by male
judges with a more skeptical eye.' Such theories gained credibility be-
cause penal policy for females was originally focused on treatment rath-
er than punishment, based on differing views of male and female crimi-
nality." In a slight twist, male protectiveness was also considered to
be responsible for harsher punishment of women whose crimes violate
traditional gender expectations because such females defy the judges'
beliefs about femininity.'
Other explanations for differential sentencing of men and women
have been formulated' reflecting assumptions about roles played by
social control' and familial responsibilit' in sentencing. Practicality
54. See Odubekun, supra 45, at 9 (containing extensive citations).
55. Id,
56. Paternalism may not be solely a male reaction. One study found evidence of
"paternalistic response towards women offenders" by both male and female probation
officers in their sentencing recommendations. See Candace Kruttschnitt, Legal Out-
comes and Legal Agents, Adding Another Dimension to the Sex-Sentencing Contro-
versy, 9 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 287, 301 (1985). In fact, a study based on felony sen-
tencing in Georgia between 1976 and 1985 concluded that courts composed exclu-
sively of males punish females more harshly than those consisting in part of female
judges. MARTHA A. MYERS & SusrrTE M. TALARiCO, THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF CRIMINAL
SENTENCING 18, 107 (1987).
57. Veretta D. Young, Gender Expectations and Their Impact on Black Female
Offenders and Victims, 3 JUsT. Q. 305, 306 (1986). See generally POLLOCK-BYRNE,
supra note 5, at chs. 2 & 3; NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, PARTAL. JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS
AND SOCIAL CONTROL chs. 2 & 3 (1990).
58. Some empirical support exists for this proposition. In one study, Rene H.
Nagel, John Cardascia and Catherine Ross found that when sentences for women
were compared, those whose offenses most departed from sexual stereotypes fared
least well in sentencing. Offense Patterns, supra note 45, at 133-34. See also Mathew
Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Differential Sentencing of Women and Men in the
U.S.A., 12 INT'L J. SOC. OF LAw 401, 410 (1984), which found women being sentenced
to longer terms than men for child abandonment and assaults.
59. See generally Odubekun, supra note 45, at 11. Kathleen Daly and Meda
Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 504, view gender as "a complex social, historical, and
cultural product .. . related to, but not simply. derived from, biological sex differenc-
es and reproductive capacities."
60. See generally Candace Kruttschnltt, Social Status and Sentences of Female
Offenders, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 247 (1981); Candace Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime and
Dependency, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 495 (1982). She finds an inverse relationship between
the amount of formal social control, such as incarceration, which is imposed by the
court and the amount of informal social control to which the offender is subject. In
other words, sentencing disparity is explained because women's lives have a high de-
gree of informal social control in family' settings which lessens the need for more
formal punishment. The status of female offenders is also deemed significant in
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rather than chivalry now explains any preferential treatment, with the
focus shifting from the female offender to the children in her care and
the likely disruption of the family unit caused by her incarceration.'
Racial disparities in sentencing are also beginning to receive' atten-
tion.' For example, it is questionable whether Black women ever bene-
determining the extent of their punishment.
Some of the social control literature incorporates the work of Carol Gilligan,
whose classic book, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 73 (1982), posited a female "ethic of care." In a criminal context,
caring is translated into deterrence because women are subject to tremendous guilt
when they engage in criminal activity that negatively affects their families. See
Simpson, supra note 45. However, since Gilligan's findings have been questioned as
reflecting mainly White middle class female values, it is unclear how much they
apply to poor or minority female offenders. Id at 621. See also Kathleen Daly, Crim-
inal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions
About Justice, 17 INT'L J. OF SOC. OF LAW 1 (1989), which critiques the applicability
of Gilligan's thesis in the penal context.
61. See Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family
Relations, and Sentencing, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 9 (1989) (hereinafter Rethinking Judi-
cial Paternalism). Professor Daly draws the distinction between judicial concern for
protecting women and concern for protecting children and families. Id. at 10-11.
Judges who were interviewed believed the care of children was more important than
their financial support, since entitlement programs could provide for basic needs. Id.
at 19-21. Professor Daly's study found no evidence that men and women without
families were sentenced differently. Id. at 18. See also Kathleen Daly, Discrimination
in the Criminal Courts:'Family, Gender and the Problems of Equal Treatment, 66
SOCIAL FORCES 153 (1987); Kathleen Daly, Structure and Practice of Familial-Based
Justice in a Criminal Court, 212 L & SocIETY REV. 267 (1987). Similarly, commenta-
tors have recognized that single fathers receive a significant sentencing advantage. See
Candace Kruttschnitt, Sex and Criminal Court Dispositions: The Unresolved Contro-
versy, 21 REs. IN CRIME & DEUNQ. 213, 227 (1984).
62. See Nicolette Parisi, Are Females Treated Differently? in JUDGE, LAWYER, VIC-
TIM, THIEF 205, 207 (Nicole Hahn Rafter & Elizabeth Anne Stanko eds., 1982); Darrell
Steffensmeier & John H. Kramer, Sex-Based Differences in the Sentencing of Adult
Criminal Defendants, An Empirical Test and Theoretical Overview, 66 Soc. & Soc.
RES. 289, 298 (1982). See also Candace Kruttschnitt, Sex and Criminal Court Dispo-
sitions: The Unresolved Controversy, 21 RES. IN CRIME AND DELINQ. 213, 227 (1984),
for an early mention of the single parenting problem.
63. For example, Vernatta D. Young, in Gender Expectations and Their Impact on
Black Female Offenders and Their Victims, 3 JUST. Q. 305, 323 (1986), argues that
negative racial stereotypes convey either that Black women deserve harsher punish-
ments or "can endure incarceration, so there is no need to focus on alternatives."
Another study found that while Black women were less likely than Black men to
be incarcerated or sentenced harshly, the sentences of Black women were compara-
ble to those of White men. The effect of family considerations was not analyzed. The
authors concluded that rather than evidence of paternalism in favor of Black females,
fitted from judicial chivalry." On the other hand, one study theorized
that the interrelationship of race and sex may result in Black women
being subjected to more paternalism than White women, because they
are more likely to be heads of households that include young chil-
dren.' While criminologists have recognized the need to focus on eth-
nicity, such research is still in its infancy.
In light of the numerous factors which affect sentencing decisions,
gender alone may no longer be the key to explaining sentencing dispari-
ty between males and females, regardless of the Guidelines. To the ex-
they had uncovered evidence of racial discrimination against Black males. Cassia
Spohn et al., Women Defendants in Court: The Interaction Between Sex and Race in
Convicting and Sentencing, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 178, 182 (1985).
Similarly, concern over disparity that results in longer sentencing of Black males
has emerged. For example, in a recent Federal Judicial Center Study, Barbara S.
Meierhoefer noted that the tendency for the sentences of Whites to be lower than
the sentences of non-Whites has become larger over time, particularly in the applica-
tion of mandatory minimum drug laws. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS 20 (1992). The
United States Sentencing Commission has also decried racial disparity in sentencing
caused by mandatory minimum penalties. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ii, 82 (August 1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES].
64. See, e.g., NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, supra note 57, 150-51 (discussing Black women
being put in chain gangs while White females were placed in reformatories); POLLOCK-
BYRNE, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that Blacks were almost entirely excluded from
reformatories).
Clarice Feinman, supra note 13, at 32, concludes that if chivalry exists in the
criminal justice system, it is reserved for White and conforming women. The dispro-
portionate. number of Black females in the federal female inmate population may
support this thesis. For example, in January 1993 not only did Black women consti-
tute 39% of federal female inmates, which was large in comparison with their number
in the general population, but their percentage of the female inmate population was
6% greater than the percentage of male Black inmates (33%) in the male inmate
population. See 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23. In contrast, the per-
centage of White women incarcerated was 6% less than that of White males. Id.
Similarly, only White women appear to have had an advantage concerning the
decision to arrest, because they were more deferential to officers than Black women
or White men. Christy Visher, Gender, Police Arrest Decisions, and Notions of Chiv-
alry, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 5, 22-23 (1983).
65. John Gruel et al., Women As Criminal Defendants: A Test For Paternalism, 37
W. POL Q. 456, 464-65 (1984). The study involved analysis of more than 10,000 felony
cases from 1977 to 1980 in Los Angeles, California. See also Kathleen Daly, Neither
Coqflict Nor Labeling Nor Paternalism Will Suffice: Intersections of Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, and Family in Criminal Court Decisions, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 136, 159
(1989). Professor Daly determined that, the effects of family ties in preferential sen-
tencing was the strongest and most consistent for Black women although her study
did not find that Black women are less likely than White women to be imprisoned.
In addition, single individuals with ties were less likely to receive an incarcerative
sentence than singles without ties. Id. at 152.
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tent sentencing preference exists, feminists view it as a two-edged
sword, since any leniency in sentencing female offenders may be inter-
twined with the exclusion of women from the economic process.' In
other words, as two male commentators have observed, "[t]he prime
structural mainstay of male dominance lies in the continued assignment
of females [to] the home and to the nurturant homemaker role...
[which] helps eliminate labor competition."' However, sole and prima-
ry caretaking responsibilities by females are the norm in our society
and sentencing practices which further familial stability have great ben-
efit to mothers and children as well as to the community at large. As
has been suggested in another context, feminists must devise a reliable
approach to reckon with generalizations which are largely true either
because of biology or highly successful socialization.' In the sentenc-
ing arena, such methodology must integrate gender assumptions con-
cerning the predominantly nonviolent nature of female crime and
parenting roles of female offenders. Merely denouncing sexism in sen-
tencing without examining the effects of so called gender-neutral sen-
tencing ultimately operates to the detriment of women whose lives are
shaped by the existing gender social structure.
The goal of eliminating gender bias in sentencing cannot be attained
simply by legislating gender neutrality in sentencing. Just as no one
would deny that differences in male and female physiology have conse-
quences in such contexts as pregnancy, health, strength, and longevity,
so too the gendered nature of crime and familial relationships should
be considered as legitimate factors in sentencing. In fact, Professor
Kathleen Daly, a well-known feminist criminologist, criticizes most dis-
parity studies as adopting an "add-women-and-stir" posture that treats
gender like variables such as race or age without reognizing that many
influences on sentencing are themselves deeply gendered.' In other
words, the severity and type of offense charged, the defendant's previ-
ous record, and indicators of stability such as family and employment
66. Darrell Steffensmeier & John H. Kramer, Sex-Based Differences in the Sen-
tencing of Adult Criminal Defendants, An Empirical Test and Theoretical Overview,
66 Soc. & Soc. RES. 289, 301 (1982).
67. Id.
68. See Aim C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1394-95 (1986) (discussing the inequality approach to analyzing gender
questions).
69. See KkTHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT: PROBLEMS OF EQUALITY
AND JUSTICE 10-11 (forthcoming 1994) (ms. on file with author).
reflect established gender patterns.' Merely equalizing punishment
may produce longer sentences for females that are not necessarily just
sentences."' Professor Daly suggests that comparable worth analyses
that have corrected for gender differences in the economic realm need
to be translated into penal policy in order to create a just approach to
punishing females.' She also posits that a sentencing scheme that fo-
cuses on women's lives, rather than men's lives, as the norm might be
better for all defendants.'
IV. THE GROWTH OF THE FEMALE PRISONER POPULATION
While criminologists continue to debate the causes of female crime
and the existence of sentencing disparity, it became evident that both
the number and percentage of sentenced women offenders was growing
at a faster rate than that of male offenders. Some commentators attrib-
ute the rise in female offenders and female imprisonment to increasing
arrests of women.74 In their view the percentage of convictions to ar-
rests has not changed, but police were simply arresting more women
who are being convicted and incarcerated. For example, a Bureau of
Justice Statistics Special Report found that over the 1980s the number
of arrests of women for drug violations increased at about twice the
rate of men. The mere increase in arrests, however, does not explain
such variations as why the percentage of women in prison for drug of-
fenses exceeds that of men.78
Professor Meda Chesney-Lind, a noted criminologist, refutes the as-
sumption that spiralling arrests are the primary cause of growing female
incarceration. She contrasted the total arrests of women to the histori-
cal data concerning female incarceration and concluded that the growth
in women's imprisonment cannot be explained by increases in women's
crime, as measured by arrests.' Instead, she posits that the war on
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id at 13-14.
72. Id. at 14, 18.
73. Id. at 15.
74. See, e.g., SUSAN K DATESMAN AND FRANK R. SCARPrrrI, WOMEN, CRIME AND
JUSTICE 3536 (1980); SIMON & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 78.
75. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHANIE MINOR-HARPER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, WOMEN IN PRISON 4 (1991) [hereinafter BJS, WOMEN]. This
report is based primarily on a 1986 Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities.
76. See id. at 5.
77. Trends in Women's Incarceration, supra note 39, at 65. Professor Chesney-Lind
reviewed statistics which showed women comprising 4% of the total prison population
around 1900, 396 in 1970 and almost 696 by 1989. She compared a 230% jump in
female incarceration from 1980 to 1989 to a 121% increase for males, and contrasted
this to the total arrests of women which increased only 6696 in the same timeframe.
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drugs, shifts in law enforcement practices, and judicial decision-making
are responsible for increasing female incarceration rather than any
change in the nature of female criminality.m She suggests that manda-
tory minimums, sentencing reforms employing guidelines based on male
models, and "get-tough" attitudes toward crime are the primary causes
of the increase." "Simply put, it appears that the criminal justice sys-
tem now seems more willing to incarcerate women."' Another crimi-
nologist has argued that the "increase in female imprisonment may be a
result of a general increase in severity of sentencing, an effect of deter-
minate sentencing, or an effect of faulty perception that female crimi-
nality and especially violent crime has tremendously increased, which
may influence judicial sentencing."' Ironically, gender-neutral sentenc-
ing has undoubtedly disadvantaged women, since the current sentenc-
ing model, which focuses on punishing violent male offenders and ma-
jor drug dealers, defies any attempt to develop a rational sentencing
policy for nonviolent female offenders, many of whom are caught up in
drug offenses because of familial relationships, and most of whom have
sole or primary parenting responsibilities.
The war on drugs is largely responsible for women no longer being
an imperceptible segment of the population sentenced to federal prison.
In the twenty-one months after full implementation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, females accounted for 15.9 percent of the 41,849 people sen-
tenced whose gender could be determined. " More recent Sentencing
Commission data confirms this trend. Women constituted 16.7 percent
and 16.4 percent of those sentenced in fiscal years 1991 and 1992.' Ab-
solute numbers of women being sentenced are also becoming notice-
able. From January 19, 1989 through September, 1992, more than 18,000
Id See also FEINMAN, supra note 13, at 20-32 (seeldng to dispel the myth that there
was any extraordinary change in the extent and nature of women's criminality from
1960-1983). POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 31, also questions whether the relatively
small increases in the percentage of total female arrests is responsible for the grow-
ing rate of imprisonment.
78. Trends in Women's Incarceration, supra note 39, at 57-58. While her analysis
includes all female sentencing, her conclusions are applicable in the federal as well
as state context. Id at 58.
79. Id, at 57-58.
80. Id at 57.
81. POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 31.
82. See I DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, Table 7
at 58.
83. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table 17 and UNIT-
ED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 13.
women were sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines.'
As more women are being sentenced, more women are being incar-
cerated. ' Punitive federal sentencing caused by harsh mandatory mini-
mums' and restrictive Sentencing Guidelines cannot be ignored. What
was once a relative handful of females in federal facilities is now a
growing minority of prisoners, with drug offenses fueling much of the
increase. Drug crimes comprised 44.5 percent of all offenses for which
women were admitted to federal prison in 1989,8? and 64.3 percent of
offenses for which women were sentenced to more than twelve
months.' These percentages were greater than the comparative statis-
tics for men, which were respectively 39.6 percent' and 58.7 per-
cent.' In August, 1991, sixty-two percent of female inmates in the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons were incarcerated for drug offenses, compared
with fifty-five percent of males.9 By January, 1993, the respective sta-
tistics had swelled to sixty-eight percent and fifty-eight percent.'2 It is
not accidental that the percentage of females incarcerated for drug of-
fenses continues to outpace that of males. This result is highly predict-
able, given that the earlier preference for a noninstitutional model of
84. From January 19, 1989 through September 30, 1990, 6633 women were sen-
tenced pursuant to the Guidelines (DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION Report,
supra note 22, Table 7), compared with 6447 sentenced from October 1, 1990
through September 30, 1991, and 6225 sentenced in fiscal year 1992. UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table 17 and UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 13. While the number of women being
sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines is increasing, it is unclear how much of the
difference is caused by the fact that in the earlier timeframe a number of women
were subject to non-guidelines sentencing.
85. Obviously this trend affects men as well as women. The ABA recently pub-
lished a report that highlighted the fact that "[tihe number of persons imprisoned is
increasing three times faster than adult arrests, and the number imprisoned for drug
offenses is increasing thirteen times faster than adult drug arrests." AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AN ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1993).
86. See generaUy MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 63. The report notes
that approximately 60 criminal statutes contain mandatory minimum penalty provi-
sions and summarizes a number of ways in which their application interferes with
and distorts the goals of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at i-iii. The Judicial Confer-
ence and the Twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted resolutions opposing
mandatory minimum statutes. Id. at App. G-1 to G-24.
87. BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Table 5-2 at 53.
88. Id., Table 5-3 at 54.
89. Id., Table 5-2 at 53.
90. Id., Table 5-3 at 54.
91. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, AUGUST
1991 CHARACTERISTICS OF INMATES IN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Source Sentry
Extract File (August 1991) [hereinafter 1991 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS] (on file with
author). This figure includes women not sentenced under the Guidelines.
92. 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23.
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female sentencing has been abrogated by mandatory drug minimums
and the operation of the Guidelines.
The brutal effects of federal criminal sentencing practices on women
becomes evident when viewed against state sentencing policy. Differ-
ences have begun to emerge when the overall percentage of female
prisoners is compared to the total federal and state inmate populations.
In 1990, women prisoners accounted for 7.6 percent of federal prison-
ers, compared to 5.5 percent of state prisoners." Moreover, from year-
end 1984 to 1990, the number of female federal inmates more than dou-
bled, increasing from 1996 to 5011.' In that timeframe, the total per-
centage of female federal inmates increased from 5.8 percent to 7.6 per-
cent.' Thus, women currently constitute more of the inmate popula-
tion in federal institutions than in state institutions, and have increased
their percentage relative to all federal prisoners. Instead of women's
deincarceration becoming a model for male sentencing, the reverse has
occurred." In other words, "the dark side of the equity or parity model
of justice" has produced "equality with a vengeance. " '
Obviously, the punitive trend in female sentencing predates the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. In particular, mandatory minimums in drug cases
play a significant role in the length of sentences for drug offenders. For
example, the number of federal drug offenders sentenced to prison rose
forty-eight percent from 1986 to 1990, at which time drug offenders ac-
counted for nearly half of all federal sentencings." However, the re-
strictions imposed by the Guidelines exacerbate the effect of the man-
datory minimums. For example, the increase in female inmate popula-
tion from year-end 1988 to year-end 1989 was 36.8 percent for federal
prisoners compared to 23.1 percent for state prisoners.' This likely re-
flects the impact of Mistretta v. United States," which signaled the
93. ROBYN L COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1990
Table 6 at 4 (1991) [hereinafter BJS, 19901.
94. Id.; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS REPORT,' PRIS-
ONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DECEMBER 31, 1984 Table 4 at 3 (1987)
[hereinafter BJS, 1984].
95. See BJS, 1990, supra note 93; BJS, 1984, supra note 94.
96. See Trends in Women's Incarceration, supra note 39, at 52.
97. Id.
98. DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, FEDERAL SENTENCING IN TRANSI-
TION, 1986-90, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1992) [hereinafter BJS,
1986-90].
99. BJS, 1990, .supra note 93, at 5.
100. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
start of guideline implementation in all judicial districts on January 18,
1989."'1 Females comprised 10.6 percent of all federal prison admis-
sions in 1989."° While both federal and state percentage increases in
female inmate population for 1990 were less than for 1989, the federal
growth rate of thirteen percent still outpaced the state increase of 7.2
percent."n In 1991, the number of female inmates again increased at a
faster rate than male inmates."°
If women received better treatment prior to the implementation of
the Guidelines, and now receive sentences approximately the same as
men, it can be argued that the Guidelines have had a disproportionately
harsher effect on' women than on men." In other words, while all de-
fendants receive longer sentences under the Guidelines than previously,
women's sentences have increased more than those of men because
before the Guidelines they received probation and shorter sentences
more often than men. For example, it appears that the sentence ranges
established by the Guidelines were created in part by determining aver-
age sentences for defendants committing selected crimes." However,
blending male and female statistics benefitted men and disadvantaged
women, because men previously received longer sentences than those
given to women."° While it could be argued that the shorter female
sentences were due to bias favoring women, it is obvious that the Com-
mission did not think about gender issues in formulating the guideline
ranges.
Comparative statistics of sentence length for prisoners under federal
jurisdiction at year-end 1988 and 1989 support the hypothesis that wom-
en were more dramatically affected by the Guidelines than men. The
number of female prisoners with sentences of more than one year rose
dramatically in that timeframe, with a 19.3 percent change in sentences
of more than one year and a 311 percent change in sentences of less
101. See I DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
102. BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Table 5-1 at 52.
103. BJS, 1990, supra note 93, Table 6 at 4.
104. TRACY L SNELL & DANIELLE C. MORTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRIS-
ONERS IN 1991 Table 5 at 4 (1992) [hereinafter BJS, 1991]. The change in female
population from 1990 to 1991 was 8.496.
105. Cf. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 63, at 19 (noting that mandatory minimums have
had a greater effect on females than males, probably due to their lower starting
point).
106. See, e.g., I DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at
21; MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 63, at 18; Nagel, supra note 3.
107. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 161 n. 91. Averaging markedly increased
the sentences of women when it was used in California's Uniform Determinate Sen-
tencing Law. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 114, 213-14 (Alfred
Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
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than one year."° In contrast, federal statistics for males showed a 9.7
percent increase for sentences of more than one year and a sixty-three
percent increase for sentences of less than one year.' Some of the
variation between male and female percentages can be discounted as a
distortion. due to the lower absolute number of females, which can re-
sult in a large percentage change with the addition of a relatively small
number of females. However, it is apparent that women who would
have received straight probation were being sentenced to serve some
time, and those who would otherwise have been incarcerated faced lon-
ger sentences.
The above statistics also confirm that probation was used less for all
offenders. In 1989 there was a 3.1 percent drop in federal probation
compared to a 5.8 percent state increase."' Similarly, during 1990, the
federal probation population continued to decrease while state proba-
tioners increased."' Indeed, offenders sentenced under the Guidelines
were generally more likely to be incarcerated than those sentenced pre-
Guidelines, with seventy-four percent being imprisoned in 1990 com-
pared to fifty-two percent in 1986."' The use of pure probation sen-
tences decreased from sixty-three percent in 1986 to forty-four percent
in the first half of 1990."' Although women who are eligible for
straight probation still do better in sentencing than men for reasons
probably tied to different offense patterns,"' the shift away from pro-
bation falls disproportionately on women who previously would not
have served any time. Twenty years ago nearly two thirds of females
convicted of federal felonies were granted probation, compared to
slightly more than one third of men."' In 1991, straight probation was
granted to twenty-eight percent of the women."" Although men are
108. BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Table 5.3 at 66 & Table 5.20 at 86.
109. Id, Table 5.2 at 65. Statistics compiled on males in federal custody by length
of sentence reveal a 15.7% increase for sentences above one year and a 19.6% in-
crease for lesser sentences. Id.
110. Id., Table 3.2, at 25.
111. LOuIS JANKOWSKI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 1990
Table 1, at 2 (1991). Federal probation dipped 1.59, while state use of probation
increased 6.196.
112. BJS, 1986-90, supra note 98, at 1. The percentage of convicted federal offend-
ers receiving some prison sentence, which could include probation, also rose from
52% in 1986 to 6096 in the first half of 1990, with most of the increase occurring
after 1988. Id.
113. id
114. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 71-72.
115. Moulds, supra note 53, at 286-87.
116.. May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 4B, 4D, 4F & 4H. These
still incarcerated more than women,"7 some form of institutionaliza-
tion has become the norm for female as well as male sentencing. As a
result, the percentage of short-term, low-risk female commitments to
federal Community Correction Centers has increased."8
Even more distressing, Black and Hispanic women are being sen-
tenced to federal prison more than White women. In 1991, forty-eight
percent of White females received a prison sentence, compared to fifty-
six percent of Black females. and sixty-nine percent of Hispanic fe-
males." ' This pattern repeated in 1992."n This apparently skewed ef-
fect may simply be a function of offense characteristics. It is likely that
minority women are overly represented in drug offenses subject to se-
vere mandatory minimum sentences. However, it raises the specter of a
criminal justice system which penalizes the illegal activities of its mi-
norities more severely than those of its White population.'2 ' Similarly,
different racial and gender patterns are emerging for downward depar-
tures."n In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, Black men and women received
a lower percentage of downward departures for reasons other than sub-
stantial assistance"n than did any other grouping of sentenced individ-
tables show that 1448 females were given probation, 956 were given probation plus
some prison time, and 2785 were sent to prison.
117. Id. at Tables 4A, 4C, 4E, & 4G. These tables report that 2932 males received
probation, 1867 received probation plus some prison time, and 21,431 were sent to
prison.
118. See Rita D. Hardy-Thompson, Community Corrections and Female Offenders, 3
FED. PRISONS J. 6 (1992).
119. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 4B, 4D, 4F & 4H.
120. Forty-eight percent of White women, 54% of Black women and 6896 of Hispanic
women were sentenced to prison. See March 17, 1993 SC Responses supra note 3,
Tables 4B, 4D, & 4F.
121. For example, penalties for crack cocaine are more severe than those for other
forms of cocaine. However, crack cocaine is more prevalent in minority communities.
See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 63, at H-17 to H-19 (summarizing
case law challenging mandatory minimums for crack cocaine on equal protection
grounds). See also UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table
31 (indicating that 91.5% of defendants sentenced for crack are Black).
122. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H, and March 17,
1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H. Certain caveats in interpreting this
information must be noted. First, it has not been subjected to analysis for statistical
significance because the actual number of departures in some categories is quite
small. Second, relying on percentages may be misleading since they can vary widely
with the addition of even a few departures given the small numbers involved. Third,
the Commission's data relies on information provided in individual cases; thus, miss-
ing or incomplete data may skew the accuracy of any statistical interpretation.
123. Substantial assistance departures are authorized by § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines
and permit the government to request a downward departure below any mandatory
minimum penalty. While such departures are supposed to be based on the usefulness
of the defendant's information to the government, they can also be a plea bargaining
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uals.Iu Again, there is no obvious reason for the discrepancy, yet it is
troubling that unless prosecutors request a substantial assistance depar-
ture, Black offenders are less likely than others to receive downward
departures.
Not only do the Guidelines help ensure that more women are incar-
cerated, but also that the women who are incarcerated spend more
time in prison. First, the Guidelines have resulted in higher rates of im-
prisonment for economic crimes," where women have always been
more highly represented. Second, although average sentences for prop-
erty crimes have decreased since 1986, the average percent of sentence
served to first release has increased."u Thus, a pre-Guidelines sentence
may have been longer, but the availability of parole resulted in less time
being served. For example, the Bureau of Prisons notes that an average
of one third of the sentence is served by pre-Guidelines offenders, com-
pared with eighty-five percent of the sentence served by offenders pur-
suant to the Guidelines.'2" Third, mean time served for drug offenders
increased from twenty-seven months in July 1984 to sixty-seven months
in June 1990."
The question of whether the guideline sentencing serves the public by
isolating dangerous criminals for a longer period of time is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, as one criminologist inquired more than
tool or method of lowering a sentence that the prosecutor believes is unjustly high.
See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Em-
pirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL L REV. 501, 531-32, 556-57 (1992).
124. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 1-A & I-B, and March
17, 1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H.
125. I DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, Table 7 at 58
& Vol. 1 at 384; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNuAL REPORT 149. See
also Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J.
393, 416 (1991) (finding a substantial reduction in the percentage of cases receiving
probation or a no-prison sentence for bank embezzlement, credit card fraud, and
postal fraud).
126. BJS, 1986-90, supra note 98, at 1, 8. For fraudulent property crimes, the per-
cent of time served rose from 67.7% in 1988, to 69.896 in 1989, to 76.7% in 1990.
127. 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23 (examining expected length of
stay).
128. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 148. Drug sen-
tences ranged from forty-eight percent to eighty-seven percent higher than pre-guide-
lines sentences and a larger proportion were sentenced to prison rather than proba-
tion. See Katie & Sager, supra note 125, at 416. See also supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text
ten years ago: -
Why has it been possible to control criminal behavior on the part of one-half of
the adult population with one-twentieth the amount of incarceration? Why are
women granted probation almost twice as often as men? ... In a period of in-
creasing pressure for forceful law and order, it is important to ask the question
whether we are headed in precisely the wrong direction in our approach to crimi-
nality. Addressing ourselves more to the human needs of the people who become
involved in criminal activity might evolve more productive policies than those
policies which emphasize police hardware and tougher prison security.'
These questions remain relevant. Moreover, women offenders are not
identical to men and equating them needlessly swells the ranks of wom-
en in prison. Women appear to have much lower recidivism rates than
men."n Moreover, the average incarcerated female is not a dangerous
offender. "[F]emale offenders overwhelmingly commit crimes that, while
unacceptable, pose little threat to the physical safety of the community
at large." 3' The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently classifies fifty per-
cent of female inmates at the minimum security level and thirty-three
percent at the low security level." Only a punitive justice system can
rationalize the imprisonment of such women who formerly would not
have been confined. Additionally, as will later be argued, imprisoning
women for larceny and drug offenses without considering the societal
effect of putting their children at risk scarcely accords with rational
sentencing or public policy.
V. DOES SENTENCING DISPARITY CURRENTLY ExasT?
Even in the legislatively mandated gender-free world of the Sentencing
Guidelines, questions about sentencing disparity of female offenders per-
sist. The United States Sentencing Commission found that women were
statistically more likely to receive sentences at the bottom of the
range." Sentence position relative to guideline range was analyzed by
the gender of defendant in approximately 18,000 cases. The Commission
concluded that women appeared to fare better in the system overall and
within the various guideline intervals than men." However, these find-
ings must be viewed with caution since they did not control for other
variables that result in more favorable sentencing, such as employment,
129. See Moulds, supra note 53, at 295.
130. Russ IMMARIGEON & MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON' CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, WOMEN'S PRISONS, OVERCROWDED AND OVERUSED 9, 12 (1992) (citing sev-
eral state empirical surveys).
131. Id. at 9.
132. 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23.
133. See II DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, Tables
132 & 133 at 359-60.
134. Id. at 352.
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first offender status, and the effect of sole or primary parenting.
Similarly, fiscal year 1991 data appears to confirm that women fare
better than men in sentencing decisions."j For example, when review-
ing the sentence type imposed for those eligible for probation with con-
ditions of confinement, it appears that men receive prison terms with
much greater frequency than women." Sentences imposed in cases eli-
gible for straight probation without any incarceration result in 26.8 per-
cent of men being sentenced to prison compared to 9.4 percent of fe-
males. 7 Indeed, women received many more sentences that included
both probation and confinement in both tables. Again, none of this in-
formation was analyzed through multivariate analysis. Thus, it is still un-
clear whether sentencing is affected solely by gender, or whether offense
characteristics provide the key reason explaining the seemingly large
differences. Moreover, whether any impact is caused by parenting re-
sponsibilities has not been analyzed.
The only Sentencing Commission Report to control for offense charac-
teristics is the Mandatory Minimum Penalties Study published in 1991,
which found that females were less likely to be sentenced at or above
minimums than men and that females received high downward depar-
tures for substantial assistance." Remarkably, the statistically signifi-
cant relationship between sentence and gender disappeared when con-
sidered in conjunction with offense characteristics." When such mat-
ters as presence of weapon, amount of drugs, role in the conspiracy, and
substantial assistance to the government were factored into the analysis,
gender did not play a role in sentencing. This also demonstrates that sole
or primary parenting responsibility was not a factor in sentencing women
when the statute requires imposition of a mandatory minimum.
As with pre-Guidelines sentencing, the empirical data may be interpret-
ed in a number of ways. A recent Federal Judicial Center study conclud-
ed that females remain more likely to receive lower sentences than men,
although such disparity is shrinking."4 For example, in 1984 women
were sixty-nine percent less likely to receive the prescribed minimum
sentence, while in 1990 they were only twenty percent less likely to be
135. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Tables 28 & 30 at
71.
136. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 8-A and 8-B.
137. Id., Tables 7-A and 7-B.
138. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 63, at 76.
139. Id.
140. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 63, at 19.
sentenced below the minimum. However, because the 1990 statistics also
included cases in which sentences were not rendered pursuant to the
Guidelines,' it is possible that much if not all of the apparent disparity
favoring women exists because of pre-Guidelines cases.'42 The study
concludes that "the mandatory minimums have had a somewhat greater
influence on the sentencing of females than of males, most probably due
to their lower starting point.""e Thus, it implicitly supports the propo-
sition that before implementation of the Guidelines women received sig-
nificantly more favorable treatment than after its implementation. At a
minimum, one can surmise that the Guidelines have played a key role in
lessening any perceived preferential treatment of females based solely on
gender. Unfortunately, family responsibility and gender have intertwined
in the case law, with the deplorable result that children have become the
unintended victims of so-called gender-neutral sentencing.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON USING OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS IN GUIDELINES
SENTENCING
As previously mentioned, because the Guidelines emphasize elimina-
tion of disparity, short shrift has been given to offender characteristics
other than the defendant's prior criminal history and role in the offense.
Even the absence of prior criminality no longer ensures leniency in sen-
tencing. Congress originally directed that "the Guidelines reflect the gen-
eral appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in
cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been con-
victed of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense."' If this
admonition had been followed, it likely would have encompassed much
female crime. However, the Guidelines' structure and practice has belied
this nonpunitive approach. The following language, reversing a departure
based in part on a female's lack of criminal record, is typical of the re-
strictive view taken in interpreting downward departures:
It is simply not the sentencing judge's prerogative if he disagrees with the guide-
line concepts to determine whether incarceration would serve a useful purpose
when the guidelines expressly provide for a minimum jail term. Because the
guidelines were promulgated to reduce a judge's complete discretion in those
matters of principle, we believe that the district court judge improperly departed
from the guidelines based on this factor.'.'
141. Id. at 1-2 & n.4.
142. See id. at 19. Meierhoefer also recognizes that the gender differences may actu-
ally reflect other factors related to gender such as child care responsibilities. Id. at
19 n.10.
143. Id,
144. 28 U.S.C. § 9940) (1992).
145. United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 844 (1991).
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The policy statements in Section 5H1 describe such factors as the
defendant's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional con-
dition, physical condition, previous employment record, and family and
community ties or responsibilities, as not ordinarily relevant in determin-
ing whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.
Similarly, current sentencing practice downplays the congressional intent
that courts impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
to comply with objectives such as reflecting the seriousness of the of-
fense, deterrence, protection of the public, and needed educational or
vocational training or medical care of the offender." Instead, the statu-
tory caveat, that courts should avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct,"7 has trumped attempts to generously permit depar-
tures in order to mitigate the harshness of the Guidelines.
Unfortunately, courts have focused too narrowly on disparity itself,
without recognizing that disparity should be forbidden only if it is unwar-
ranted. Thus, while factors such as sole or primary parenting responsi-
bility might cause disparity, this result is warranted because of societal
concerns about the well-being of children. Indeed, even the Sentencing
Commission recognized that "a court's departure authority is a critical
component in the successful implementation of the Guidelines system.
Departures are sometimes appropriate and necessary to achieve a just
sentence in a particular case where an important factor is not reflected
in the guidelines .... "4
Moreover, courts have unduly limited their sentencing discretion de-
spite the congressional mandate that no limitation should be placed on
the information received and considered by the court in imposing sen-
tence concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense. "9 The Guidelines further provide that in deter-
mining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a
departure from the Guidelines is warranted, the court may consider with-
out limitation any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law."w At a
minimum, courts appear to agree that these provisions permit consid-
eration of offender characteristics, including family ties, in calculating a
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1992).
147. Id.
148. I DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 241.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1982).
150. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § IB1.4 (Supp. 1992).
suitable sentence within the applicable guideline range."' As a result,
no justification is necessary to sentence a single parent or a pregnant of-
fender at the bottom of the guideline range."
In contrast, departures are allowed only in limited circumstances.
First, the Policy Statements in Section 5H1 do not permit factors such as
health, mental outlook and family circumstances to "ordinarily" justify
downward departures. Second, departures are also permitted when the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines." To determine
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the
court considers only the Sentencing Guidelines, policy statements, and
official commentary."
In evaluating whether to grant a departure, some circuits have regular-
ly examined the totality of circumstances." The Sentencing Comrnis-
sion recently proposed an amendment to the Commentary of Section
5H1, which would have permitted offender characteristics to be com-
bined to determine the applicability of a departure." However, this pro-
posal was not adopted. To the extent that this methodology is available,
151. See, e.g., United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1468-70 (9th Cir. 1991) (in-
terpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and § 3661); United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919
F.2d 946, 953-56 (5th Cir. 1990) (rehabilitative potential); United States v. Duarte, 901
F.2d 1498, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1990) (character references). Similarly, in United States v.
Fiterman, 732 F. Supp. 878, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the court denied a departure based
on family responsibilities concerning the defendant's disabled adult sons, but did use
this factor to assign the minimum sentence permitted within the guideline range. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Denoncourt, 751 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D. Haw. 1990)
(sentencing a pregnant woman at low end of guideline range).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. 1992). See also U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.0
(concerning grounds for departure).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. 1992).
155. For instance, United States v. Takai, 930 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991), noted:
[iun making a decision in any particular case, good judgment will often re-
quire the evaluation of a complex of factors. No single factor may be enough
to point to the wise course of action. But a wise person will not look on
each particular factor abstractly and alone. Rather, it will be how the particu-
lar pieces fit together, converge, and influence each other that will lead to
the correct decision.
Id, at 1434. Similarly, United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1991), rec-
ognized that a judge need not specify the weight given to each element and decide
whether each would independently qualify as a mitigating circumstance. Floyd quoted
the language in United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149, 13 (9th Cir. 1991), that "[t]here
is no reason to be so literal-minded as to hold that a combination of factors cannot
together constitute a 'mitigating circumstance."
156. See 57 Fed. Reg. 112, ch. 5, pts. A & H (1992) (discussing specific offender
characteristics and departures).
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it is helpful in evaluating departures of female offenders because their
lives may demonstrate a number of 'disparate themes which can be wo-
ven into a narrative which justifies a departure. Even in using the totality
standard, the complex of factors considered must be at least authorized
and certainly not expressly prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines.5
In addition, the factual predicate of the relevant findings are subject to
the clearly erroneous standard of review."
The totality approach can result in a departure where a single factor
alone might not be sufficient justification. It enables judges to provide
more individualized sentencing for all offenders, and is particularly useful
in sentencing females who are first offenders because it permits the use
of aberrant behavior as a possible justification for a downward depar-
tures."T Therefore, a court need not rely solely on a crime being consid-
ered a single act of aberrant behavior, or on one of the offender char-
acteristics found in Section 5H1 being considered extraordinary in isola-
tion from other factors. For example, the case United States v. Takai'®
explored the kinds of conduct that represent single acts of aberrant be-
havior sufficient to permit a downward departure. The defendants were
convicted of bribing an official to obtain green cards for some relatives
and friends. One of the offenders, a 42-year-old housewife with no crimi-
nal history, "stumbled into something, awkwardly, naively, and with in-
sufficient reflection on the seriousness of the crime she was propos-
ing. "" ' The bribery did not involve any individual gain for the defen-
dants and occurred by happenstance. Thus, while not every first offense
is synonymous with aberrant behavior, these factors were sufficient to
support a downward departure.
However, some courts do not view the lack of criminal record as sup-
porting a downward departure based on aberrant conduct." Frequent-
157. United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1992).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1495-56 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the behavior of a first offender who was a single mother was aberrational).
160. 930 F.2d 1427, 1434 (9th Cir. 1991).
161. d. at 1432. While it is legitimate to ask whether such a characterization of a
female is patronizing, the flavor of the opinion is that the defendant's culpability in
committing the crime was less than in usual offenses of this sort because nio finan-
cial gain was involved. Thus, regardless of whether the defendant's naivety was due
in part to her gendered socialization, it was relevant in determining the appropriate-
ness of a departure.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324-25 (7th Cir.
ly, the property and drug offenses for which women are most often sen-
tenced are crimes that extend over time. Therefore, they do not fit within
the single spontaneous act framework required by some circuits for aber-
rant behavior."6 For example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a downward
departure given to a woman convicted of concealing a felon, in part be-
cause of her continued involvement with the felon after learning of his
fugitive status.' " Reference to tragic personal background as justifying
departure has similarly met with limited success, but may be com-
bined with other reasons for departure." Generally, offender charac-
teristics which accounted for much of the earlier preferential sentencing
of female offenders rarely are a factor in Guidelines sentencing.
VII. CARING FOR CHILDREN: FACTORING THE GENDERED NATURE
OF CHILD CARE INTO GUIDELINES SENTENCING
A. Should Single Moms and Pregnant Offenders Be Eligible for
Downward Departures?
Application of the Policy Statements found in Section 5H1 raise the
most difficult fairness issues concerning the effects of sex-neutral sen-
tencing of females under the Guidelines. 7 The dilemma that confronts
judges most frequently is the extent to which they can grant departures
based on concerns about children or pregnancy. Congress directed the
Commission to reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsi-
bilities, and community ties of the defendants in the Guidelines and poli-
1990). Brewer appears to completely reject a departure for aberrational conduct,
while Carey simply refuses one based on lack of criminal history.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 847.48 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 496 U.S. 968 (1990) (affirming refusal to depart for aberrant behavior where
female first-time offender was involved in family conspiracy that had multiple transac-
tions).
164. United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 1992).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez 938 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United
States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1990) (refusing departure).
166. For example, during the time frame that departures for lack of youthful guid-
ance were granted pursuant to United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.
1991), the Ninth Circuit remanded a case to determine if the court knew it could
depart when a female defendant argued psychological impairment arising from her
chaotic and abusive childhood. United States v. Kiba, 951 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1986 (1992), an unpublished decision available on Westlaw.
167. The Commission is studying the impact of gender on sentencing in its current
research on pre-guideline and post-guideline sentencing, but no time frame has been
indicated for the completion of that research. See Letter from Phyllis Newton, Staff
Director of the United States Sentencing Commission, May 26, 1992 SC Responses,
supra note 3.
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cy statements." In response, Policy Statement 5H1.6 provides that
[flamily ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.
Family responsibilities that are complied with may be relevant to the determina-
tion of the amount of restitution or fine.
As a result, relatively few departures are granted for these reasons. For
example, family-based departures have declined in percentage as a rea-
son for downward departures every year since 1989 and have fallen from
the third to the fifth-most cited reason for downward departures."l
Thus, in 1989, they constituted five percent of total departures; ° and in
1992 less than two percent of all departures were for this reason. 7' The
absolute number of such departures is also quite small. In light of the
widespread appellate hostility towards departures for family ties, it is re-
markable that even 141 departures were granted for this reason in 1992.
Trial judges appear more sympathetic than appellate courts to departures
based on family ties, although the published cases are centered in the
Second Circuit, which has authored most of the few appellate decisions
supporting generous use of family ties departures.tm It is likely that con-
siderably more women would be granted such departures if the appellate
climate were more hospitable, since many women inmates are single
mothers.
Undoubtedly, family ties departures are requested more often by fe-
males than males. In 1992, women received fifty-six percent of all family
ties departures,'" and in 1991, forty-five percent of such departures,74
despite the fact that women were being less than seventeen percent of
the sentenced population in both years. Excluding departures for sub-
stantial assistance, in 1991, sixteen percent of female departures and
168. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (Supp. 1992).
169. Compare UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTS for 1989 and
1991, respectively at Table IX at 50, and Table 54 at 137.
170. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1989 ANNUAL REPORT Table IX at 50.
171. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 49. In 1990
family departures were nearly four percent. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
1990 ANNUAL REPORT Table R at 72. In 1991, they accounted for only two percent of
all departures. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table 54
at 137.
172. See United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1992) (single mother);
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (male supporting wife, chil-
dren, parent and grandparent).
173. See March 17, 1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H.
174. See May 26, 1992 SC Reponses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H.
three percent of male departures were granted for family ties.7 ' In
1991, Black women received almost ten percent fewer family departures
than their percentage of the sentenced female population, while in 1992,
they were only one percent lower. In both years, Hispanic women re-
ceived significantly more than their relative share of family depar-
tures."8 It is unclear why this lopsided result occurred. Given the gen-
eral population data concerning single mothers,'" one might assume
that Black and Hispanic women would be requesting more single parent
departures than White women. However, there is no easy reason that
explains why Hispanic women would fare so much better in obtaining
them. One possibility is that stereotypes about Hispanic and Black fani-
lies are predisposing judges to look favorably when Hispanic women
request family departures and negatively when they are requested by
Black women who have previously made use of female kinship networks
to care for their children. Whatever the reason, any underrepresentation
of Black women in obtaining family ties departures is disturbing.
While the Sentencing Commission also provided data concerning de-
pendents for whom the defendant provides financial support, it could not
differentiate spouses from children, or identify single parents."t Even
given this weakness, several generalizations may be warranted. First, the
likelihood of a woman with a dependent being given a prison term is
much greater if the female is Black or Hispanic than if she is categorized
as White or Other. This racial and ethnic disparity is also true for men.
Second, every category of females with dependents was incarcerated less
often than any category of males with dependents." This may reflect
offense characteristics and prior criminal history. However, to the extent
that judges can grant probation and family-based departures it may indi-
175. Fiscal year 1991 departure data, which includes race and gender information,
reveals that 61 females were given departure for family ties out of 378 departures
given women for reasons other than substantial assistance. This compares with 49
male family ties departures out of 1443 total male departures other than for substan-
tial assistance. Id. The respective statistics for 1992 were 1896 of female departures
and 4% of male departures. See March 17, 1993 SC Reponses, supm note 3, Tables
2A-2H.
176. In 1991, Black females received 24% of family departures and constituted 34%
of the sentenced female population, while in 1992 they received 33% of family depar-
tures and were 34% of the female population. Hispanic women received 2696 of family
departures and were 17% of the sentenced female population in 1991. In 1992, they
obtained 2096 of the family departures and were 15% of the female population.
177. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
178. May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Letter from Phyllis J. Newton, Staff
Director, United States Sentencing Commission. The fact that the categories for
collecting data do not reflect information of significance to women is not surprising
given that women appear to be an afterthought in sentencing guidelines policy.
179. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses supra note 3, Tables 4A-4H, and March 17,
1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 4A-4H.
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cate that they believe that incarcerating mothers, many of whom have
sole or primary parenting responsibilities, has a substantial detrimental
impact on minor children.
B. The Conflicting Case Law Concerning Single Parenting
The relatively small number of family-based departures reflects per-
ceived appellate hostility found in case law interpreting Policy Statement
5H1.6. For example, in United States v. Thomas," the Seventh Circuit
held that no departure is allowed for family ties for sentences other than
probation.8' Not surprisingly, Ms. Thomas was a single mother caring
for her two mentally disabled adult childrent and a young grandchild. Thom-
as found that Section 5HI.6 contained no suggestion that departure may
be based on family considerations if they strike judges as particularly
compelling. " It viewed the reference to fines and restitution in the Sec-
tion 5HI.6 commentary as exhaustive, rather than illustrative of circum-
stances in which family-based departures could be granted. The policy
statement declaring that family responsibilities are relevant when proba-
tion is an option was interpreted as suggesting that the Commission did
not intend them to be relevant when probation is not a sentencing op-
tion.'
A number of other circuits seem to recognize the discretion of judges
to depart based on family ties in all cases,"" but have held that down-
ward departures cannot be given to single parents because the effect of
the mother's incarceration on a young child is not extraordinary."n In
180. 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
181. Id. at, 530.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. For a thorough review of the general family ties departure case law, see Susan
E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing Guidelines: Doumward Departures Based on a
Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REv. 957,
966-70 (1992).
185. United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 106-07 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 334 (1992); United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 167 (1992); United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir.
1992); United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1982 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 585 (1990); United States v.
Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509-11 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990). Cf.
United States v. Can, 932 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 112
(1991) (reversing departures of couple with four-year-old son, noting that the sentence
of one parent could have been stayed to the end of the other's sentence). However,
United States v. Brand," the Fourth Circuit asserted the classic justifi-
cation for refusing departures to single mothers whose children will be
placed with strangers:
[Sluch a situation is not extraordinary. A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in
today's society, and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the par-
ent from the children. It is apparent that in many cases the other parent may be
unable or unwilling to care for the children, and that the children will have to live
with relatives, friends, or even in foster homes.'
Brand concluded that "[the defendant's] situation, though unfortunate, is
simply not out of the ordinary,"'" despite the District Judge's conclu-
sion that "[tihe carrying forward of the guideline range of im-
prisonment... would have a devastating impact upon the emotions,
minds and the physical well being, just every aspect, of two very inno-
cent youngsters ... ." However, the Fourth Circuit has recognized
that in combination, family circumstances may justify a departure." In-
deed, in United States v. Calle,"' Judge Ramsey recently granted a fam-
ily based departure in a case where the fact that both parents faced cer-
tain incarceration required the relocation of their three-year-old child to fami-
ly care outside the United States." Calle relied on favorable out-of-cir-
cuit precedent, studiously avoiding any reference to potentially unfavor-
ably Fourth Circuit family ties case law." In contrast, the Sixth Circuit
specifically relied on the fact that sex is irrelevant to guideline sentenc-
ing in disregarding the effects of incarceration on children."
Sometimes, refusal to grant a departure to a single mother is affirmed
simply because it is considered an unreviewable discretionary decision
by a judge that the particular circumstances are not extraordinary
this result appears impractical in most drug cases involving long mandatory mini-
mums.
186. 907 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 585 (1990).
187. Id. at 33.
188. Id. The Brand court compared the case to United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990). Ironically, Daly involved a male and
there is no indication that he personally was a single parent. The oft-cited language
from Daly is that he "has shown nothing more than that which innumerable defen-
dants could no doubt establish: namely, that the imposition of prison sentences
normally disrupts spousal and parental relationships .... I" d. at 319.
189. Brand, 907 F.2d at 33,
190. See United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding the
case to see if judge exercised his discretion or thought he had no discretion in
refusing a departure of a pregnant offender who had several other children).
191. 796 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1992).
192. Id. at 857.
193. Given the well-researched nature of the opinion, it is unlikely that the judge
was ignorant of the potentially conflicting precedent
194. United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 127 (1990).
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enough to require a downward departure." For example, in United
States v. Johnson, u the trial judge indicated the only reason he would
issue a sentence below the Guidelines was for the welfare of the
defendant's infant which was "not a reasonable basis for a departure; as
tough as it is for you and more importantly for your child."9 ' The
Eighth Circuit assumed that this language demonstrated that the court
had exercised its discretion not to depart, rather than its belief that it
could not depart. Thus, a defendant can obtain appellate review only if
the trial court clearly asserts that it has no discretion to depart. Ironical-
ly, the prosecution can more easily obtain reviews of family-based down-
ward departures by arguing that single parenting is not an appropriate
reason for departure.'" Indeed, Judge Edwards has generally com-
plained of the "disparity between the relative ease of upward departure
and the niggardly application of downward adjustments" by appellate
courts which "seem quick enough to warrant upward departure, while
mitigating factors are often rejected as 'adequately considered' by the
Sentencing Commission. " '
The apparent appellate distaste for single parent departures led the
Third Circuit to overstate their inappropriateness in United States v.
Headley.' While affirming the unavailability of a departure based on a
female's status as a single mother of five young children, Headley
claimed that every court to consider the issue of departure based on the
effect that sentencing a single parent to prison will have on minor chil-
dren has found the circumstances not to be extraordinary,"' despite the
existence of a number of district court decisions that had permitted such
'195. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 979 F.2d 51, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth
Circuit, among others, follows the policy that it "will not review a district court's
refusal to depart from the Guidelines, unless the refusal was in violation of law." Id.
at 54 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 462 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations omitted)). As a result, most family issues cannot be raised on appeal by
the defendant because the circuits will not review judges' discretionary refusals to
depart from the Guidelines.
196. 908 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1990).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 32 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 585 (1990);
United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
127 (1990).
199. United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
200. 923 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991)
201. Id,
departures.' Moreover, none of the decisions cited by Headley in-
volved as many children or discussed special problems associated with
the likely separation of siblings during their mother's incarceration. Thus,
deciding in the abstract that single parenting was not extraordinary ig-
nored the extraordinary single parenting situation present in Headley.
More recently, in United States v. Gaskill,m the Third Circuit nar-
rowed its view of Headley, by noting that the children would have inevi-
tably been in foster care even if the sentence had been substantially re-
duced because the lower end of the applicable Guideline range for the
drug charges was seventeen and a half years. Therefore, in that case,
family ties were not an appropriate basis for a downward departure giv-
en the length of imprisonment and nature of the offense.' GaskiU affir-
matively cited several decisions in which departures were granted to
single mothers whose circumstances were considered extraordinary.
The Second Circuit has been favorably inclined towards family based
departures. In United States v. Johnson,' it approved a thirteen-level
downward departure' to a single mother who was raising four chil-
dren, including an infant and the child of her institutionalized daugh-
ter.' Johnson cautioned against blind reliance on sentencing policy
statements such as Section 5H1.6, noting that the central question re-
mains whether an aggravating or mitigating circumstance has not ade-
quately been taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.'
As the court noted, Ms. Johnson "faced more than the responsibilities of
an ordinary parent, more even than those of an ordinary single par-
ent .... The number, age and circumstances of these children all sup-
port the finding that Johnson faced extraordinary parental responsibili-
202. See infra notes 211 and 221. Headley also did not cite United States v.
Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1990), which implied that some parenting cir-
cumstances could be extraordinary.
203. 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993).
204. While the Court did not expressly state that the charges were subject to a
mandatory minimum penalty, it is likely that the Court could not depart below a five-
or ten-year mandatory sentence without a U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.1 motion. However,
this Article will later suggest that family ties departures should also be considered in
determining the length of any prison sentence to the extent that it exceeds the
mandatory minimum. See infra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
205.' 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
206. The departure for family ties accounted for a ten-level downward adjustment.
Id. at 126.
207. This decision was presaged by United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d
Cir. 1991), which justified a downward departure of a male supporting his wife, two
children, a disabled father, and a grandmother, based on family responsibilities. As
Johnson noted, the single mother's situation was "substantially more compelling than
that of the defendant in Alba," whose wife could take care of his two children and
elderly dependents. Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129.
208. Johnson, 964 F.2d at 128.
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ties. " ' Johnson explicitedly recognized that the rationale for the down-
ward departure was not that it decreased the defendant's culpability, "but
that we are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents
who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.""0 In other
words, the departure was not on behalf of the defendant herself, but on
behalf of her family. Numerous district court cases within the Second
Circuit have granted departures for single mothers both before and since
Johnson,21 ' and the Second Circuit has virtually invited family ties de-
partures for males and females.212
Other circuits have also factored single parenthood into the departure
matrix. In United States v. Pena,"' the Tenth Circuit upheld a depar-
ture for a single mother of a two-month-old child, a sixteen-year-old
daughter and an infant grandchild. The defendant had no other felony
convictions and had been employed long term. The trial judge also noted
that the defendant was no threat to the public and would be justly pun-
ished by a sentence of probation with community confinement. The ap-
pellate court viewed this as an implicit finding that Pena's behavior was
an aberration from her usual conduct. The aberrational character of her
conduct, combined with her responsibility to support two infants, justi-
fied a departure."4
While the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that the policy state-
ments prohibiting the ordinary usage of Section 5H1 factors permit their
use in an extraordinary case,"' it has not clearly grappled with the defini-
209. Id. at 129.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 747-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Mills, Nos. 88 CR 956
(CSH) & 89 CR 256 (CSH), 1990 WL 8081 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1990). United States v.
Gonzalez, No. S 88 CR 559 (CSH), 1989 WL 86021 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 27, 1989); United
States v. Hon, No. 89 CR 0052 (RWS), 1989 WL 59613 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989);
United States v. Williams, 88 CR 144 (E.D.N.Y 1988).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Califano, 978 F.2d 65, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1992) and
United States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1990) (remanding cases in
which males requested family ties departures, suggesting that the trial courts might
not have recognized the scope of their authority to depart for this reason).
213. 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1991).
214. Id. at 1494-95.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1100 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1470 (th Cir. 1991); United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538,
643 (9th Cir. 1990).
tion of "extraordinary" in the family context. For example, in United
States v. Berlier,216 efforts to keep the family together did not justify a
downward departure. However, in that case, the wife of the male being
sentenced continued to care for the children alone. Similarly, United
States v. Miller ' cited Berlier in reversing a family departure granted
to a married mother of two children. In United States v. Floyd,"8 up-
holding a downward departure based on the defendant's youthful lack of
guidance, the Court favorably cited decisions permitting family-based
parenting departures as examples of extraordinary circumstances. At
least one district court in the Ninth Circuit permitted a family ties depar-
ture to a single mother of six children."9 Similarly, a district court in
the District of Columbia Circuit permitted a departure for a homeless
single mother of two young children.'
The Eighth Circuit at first appeared sympathetic to downward depar-
ture for family reasons." However, United States v. Harrison,'m held
that a district court lacked authority to depart where the adopted minor
child of a single grandparent would be cared for during her incarceration
by the child's mother. The natural mother allegedly abused chemical
substances or alcohol and went out frequently. Harrison seems to take a
case by case approach to departures for single parents, noting that a
number of district courts permit such departures where other mitigating
factors are involved. Its holding appears based on the fact that there was
216. 948 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1991).
217. 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Shrewsberry, 980 F.2d
1296 (9th Cir. 1992), in which the court noted that the trial judge's decision that the
female's family circumstances were not sufficiently unusual to justify departure was
consistent with "Guidelines policy to downplay the relevance of family ties." Id. at
1298. No details were given about her family situation.
218. 945 F.2d 1096, 1101 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991). The holding in Floyd has been over-
ruled by the Commission's later policy statement in Section 5H1.12.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 790 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (finding
that when six children face likely separation and placement in foster care, such cir-
cumstances are relevant to the sentencing process).
220. United States v. Jackson, 756 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 1991).
221. United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990), upheld a
downward departure of a male who supported his family despite the economic hard-
ship of living on an Indian reservation.
District courts in that circuit permitted such departures to single mothers. See
United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (D. Minn. 1990) (granting a departure
to a single mom of four young children whose imprisonment would place these
minor children at risk). In United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 (W.D.
Mo. 1988), the judge noted that he departed in another case because both parents of
a small child were being imprisoned for serious crimes, but not so grave as to make
it unreasonable to consider the effect of imprisonment on the defendants' small chil-
dren.
222. 970 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1992).
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no evidence concerning the unfitness of the child's natural mother, other
than the brief remarks by counsel. The First Circuit recently appeared to
soften its disapproval of single parent departures in United States v.
Rivera.' In Rivera, a woman with three small children who lived on
welfare because her former husband gave her no financial aid, transport-
ed cocaine in order to buy Christmas presents for her children.' She
had never engaged in any other criminal activity. The trial judge com-
mented that he would grant her a departure, but had no discretion to do
so.' The appellate court noted that family departures were discouraged
but not forbidden. Therefore, it reviewed the conflicting case law to de-
termine if Rivera's circumstances would support a lawful departure. The
court concluded that the district judge had discretion to grant the depar-
ture, citing its two previous refusals to approve such a departure as cas-
es in which the circumstances were less compelling. Rivera did not
clarify why the two female defendants who did not fare well with the
First Circuit provided less sympathetic family departure candidates. Such
an explanation would have been difficult since one was a single mother
of four children who assisted the prosecution, 7 and the other was a
pregnant defendant with no prior record whose involvement in her
husband's drug trafficking was limited to enjoying its financial bene-
fits.' Undoubtedly, the compelling difference in Rivera related to the
aberrational reason for her drug dealing. As a result, Rivera's analysis
also appears to have undermined the First Circuit's earlier rejection of
the totality approach to determining departures.' Thus, the. case law
concerning single mothers is in disarray, but it appears that a number of
circuits are still fairly hostile to child-based departures.
C. The Scant Case Law Concerning Pregnant Offenders
Currently, relatively few pregnant offenders are incarcerated in federal
facilities before they give birth. Preliminary data from a 1991 federal
inmate survey found that about five percent of the female inmates were
223. 1993 WL 181368 (ist Cir. June 4, 1993).
224. Id. at *9.
225. Id. at *9-10.
226. Id. at *10.
227. United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
334 (1992).
228. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943
(1990).
229. Pozzy, 902 F.2d at 138.
pregnant at the time of their admission to a federal facility.'m Similarly,
federal institutions reported a total of 149 births in 1991 and 71 births in
the first six months of 1992." No data exists concerning the number of
sentenced women who are pregnant. As a practical matter, most preg-
nancy departures will revolve around child care and maternal bonding
issues since judges have within their discretion the ability to stay sen-
tences until the child is born.'
While many pregnant offenders will shortly become single mothers,
their sentencing raises issues in addition to child rearing. For example,
pregnancy may fall within policy statement Section 5H1.4 concerning
physical condition, which like Section 5H1.6 states that departures
should not ordinarily be granted. Further, since it has been recognized
that a majority of pregnant federal prisoners meet some criteria of hav-
ing high-risk pregnancies,' is it appropriate for the judge to consider
the adequacy of prenatal care in prison facilities? If so, should sentencing
be delayed until after the child is born? How long should the new mother
be permitted to bond with or care for her infant before her imprison-
ment? Conversely, considering the high miscarriage rate in prison, is it
ever appropriate to incarcerate a pregnant woman who uses drugs in
order to prevent her from a course of conduct harmful to the fetus? It is
understandable that judges would consider the timing of the pregnancy
in determining whether to grant a departure. However, an offender who
pleads her stomach is not likely to be favorably sentenced if it appears
that she became pregnant post-arrest in order to obtain a lighter sen-
tence. Nevertheless, if she or her spouse is likely to be sentenced to a
lengthy prison term, is it fair to also sentence them to childlessness?
Regardless of particular policy determinations, pregnancy, like single
motherhood, is a factor which should be evaluated in the departure ma-
trix.
Few sentencing guideline cases focus on pregnant offenders. Although
the First Circuit rejected a downward departure for a pregnant woman in
United States v. Pozzy, this decision should be viewed with great
caution. First, it rejects the totality of circumstances approach which
230. April 27, 1993 BOP Responses, supra note 34, at 1.
231. Bureau of Prisons, Health Services Division, Document prepared December 7,
1992 and Memorandum dated August 20, 1992 (on file with author).
232. Occasionally a judge will sentence pregnant offenders to time served instead of
staying a sentence. In United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
this was done to ensure that the offender could return to her home in Ghana before
her child was born. Id. Similarly, when a pregnant offender has been incarcerated
prior to the trial, the judge may be able to justify sentencing her to time served.
233. See Anita G. Huft et al., Care of the Pregnant Offender, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 49,
51 (1992).
234. 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
[Vol. 20: 905, 19931 Federal Sentencing Guidelines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
may be available in a given circuit.' Second, Pozzy considered the ab-
sence of any mention of pregnancy in Sections 5H1.6 and 5HI.4 as an
affirmative representation that the Commission had considered pregnan-
cy and purposely discounted it.' However, it is questionable whether
an omission should ever be equated with consideration, if there was no
reference to the particular factor in the legislative history. Third, the
First Circuit's conclusion that .pregnancy is neither atypical nor unusu-
al' is suspect. It is equally reasonable to argue that "not ordinarily"
should be read in relation to the total population being sentenced, not
simply women, in light of the gender-neutral admonition in Section
5H1.10. In fact, any other reading appears to violate Section 5H1.LO's ban
on consideration based on sex, since only women can become pregnant.
Fourth, the decision does not give appropriate deference to the trial
judge's findings of fact.
In Pozzy, the trial judge had permitted the departure on several
grounds, including the psychological standpoint of the defendant's health
and that of the child not to be born in prison, as well as the lack of any
halfway house to which the defendant could be sentenced which would
permit her to care for the child. The appellate court's pontification that
"it has been recognized since time immemorial that the sins of parents
are visited upon their children " ' was scarcely a justification for its ut-
ter disregard of the judge's factual findings. The First Circuit observed
that the judge could have stayed the defendant's commitment until after
her child was born, and questioned the motivation for the pregnancy
which occurred after arrest.' However, such factual issues should have
resulted in a reversal only if the trial judge's ruling was clearly errone-
ous.' Decisions like Pozzy also completely ignore the "systematic fail-
ure of correctional systems to respond to the critical medical needs of
pregnant prisoners." "
235. See, e.g., United States v. Takai, 930 F.2d 1427, 1434 (9th Cir. 1991). In addi-
tion, United States v. Rivera, 1993 WL 181368 (1st Cir. June 4, 1993), may have
revived the totality approach in the First Circuit.
236. 902 F.2d at 139.
237. Id,
238. Id.
239. Id
240. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp. 1992). Cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985). In United States v. Rivera, 1993 WL 181368 (1st Cir. June 4,
1993), the First Circuit recently decided that deference should be accorded to factual
decisions that circumstances are not ordinary. Id. at *8.
241. Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1989). While
In contrast, in United States v. Williams,U Judge Sweet granted a
departure to a pregnant defendant, citing the risk of death or injury to
the mother or fetus if she had a complicated pregnancy. Judge Weinstein
alluded to the policy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons of prohibiting chil-
dren in prison, when he granted a downward departure to a pregnant
offender who would almost certainly have lost permanent custody of her
child due to her incarceration for more than one year.' In United
States v. Denoncourt,' although departure was not at issue since the
offender could avoid prison by being sentenced at the low end of the
guideline range, the judge observed that the defendant's prior history of
drug abuse and prostitution constituted an extraordinary physical impair-
ment which might endanger her unborn child."s The judge also rejected
the prosecutor's request for an upward departure to incarcerate the de-
fendant, who was in her third trimester, in order to protect her unborn
baby from any further cocaine use.' Instead, the judge placed her in a
halfway house to ensure proper medical and drug treatment, as well as
to provide supervision.2"7 While in United States v. Arize248 Judge
Weinstein granted a departure to a female drug courier who did not
know she was pregnant at the time of the offense, he commented that
routine lenient sentencing of such "mules" might have a negative general
deterrence effect since drug dealers often recruit pregnant carriers."
This review of the caselaw reveals that pregnancy, like single parenting,
is not treated consistently in the departure matrix.
some state systems have more problems than the federal system in providing medical
assistance, federal facilities clearly are not set up to provide routine prenatal care as
would be available in a nonprison setting. See id. at 190. For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Gender Bias Task Force found anecdotal evidence of pregnant women receiving
no medical checkups and erratic medical care. TAsx FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at
154. One male federal public defender reported knowledge "of 'incredibly high' rates
of spontaneous miscarriage while women were detained." Id. at 159. The report also
noted that a pregnant inmate can generally obtain an abortion only if she can afford
it, and with no provision for post-abortion counseling. Id. at 154.
242. No. 88 CR 144 (E.D.N.Y 1988).
243. See United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAw, §§ 384-b3, 384-b4(d) & 387-b7(a) (McKinney 1989)). The defendant
was sentenced to time served to facilitate her return to Ghana before the child was
born. Id at 748-49.
244. 751 F. Supp. 168 (D. Haw. 1990).
245. Id. at 170.
246. Id. at 169.
247. Id. at 171-72.
248. 792 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
249. Id.
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D. Are Single Mothers and Mothers-to-be Ordinary or Their Children
Contemplated by the Guidelines?
Unquestionably, pregnant women and single mothers should be eligible
for downward departures in the current Guidelines regime. Such depar-
tures are warranted because neither single mothers nor mothers-to-be
are ordinary when viewed in the framework of the total sentenced popu-
lation. Alternatively, such departures are authorized because the Guide-
lines did not contemplate the effect of incarceration on the children of
single mothers. Even though the Guidelines are written in gender-neutral
language, some of the policy, commentary, and application notes were
drafted using solely male pronouns. In fact, a recent Westlaw search re-
vealed thirty-one references to "he" in the Sentencing Guidelines data-
base. Thus, it is legitimate to question whether the Commission, when
interpreting policy statements, has adequately 'considered any potentially
disparate consequences to women.
There is absolutely no indication that the Commission ever considered
pregnancy and single parenting, let alone the lopsided gender effect that
imprisoning single mothers has on their children. Yet the empirical data
points to the gendered nature of single parenthood. A recent census
report recognized that the vast majority of all single parents-eighty-eight
percent-are female.' Another census report acknowledged that "the
tremendous increase in the number of single parents has been one of the
most profound changes in family composition to have occurred during
the past quarter century." " In 1991, 10.1 million single parents were
reported, compared to 3.8 million in 1970.' Equally striking, in twenty
years, single parents grew dramatically from thirteen to twenty-nine per-
cent of family groups with children.' As earlier discussed, most female
inmates have children, and the majority are single mothers.'
250. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1992 XI.
251. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-20, No. 458, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS:
MARCH 1991 8.
252. IkL
253. Id at 9.
254. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the 1991 federal
survey of inmates did not specifically ask how many of the female inmates with chil-
dren were single mothers. The survey confirmed that 8096 of female inmates were
mothers, although only 45% of all female inmates had minor children. April 27, 1993
The single parenting problem falls disproportionately upon women
offenders than on male offenders, but may affect minority women of-
fenders more severely than White female offenders. While currently al-
most two-thirds of single parents are White,' single parenting is much
more prevalent among Blacks than Whites.' In fact, almost sixty-three
percent of Black family groups with children are single-parent, as com-
pared with twenty-three percent of White family groups."' Single
parenting among Hispanics has also increased, now comprising about
one-third of Hispanic family groups with children.' Presently, 92.6 per-
cent of Black single parents are female, compared to 86.7 percent who
are Hispanic and 83.7 percent who are White.' It is almost a certainty
that a majority of female federal prisoners are minority women. ' ° This
is consistent with Sentencing Commission data which shows that minori-
ty women are now the majority of sentenced female offenders." More-
over, Black females consistently have comprised a higher percentage of
the federal female inmate population than the comparable percentage of
BOP Responses, supra note 34, Table 1.
255. Id,
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id
259. Id., Table F at 9.
260. While White females compose the largest category of female federal inmates,
Hispanic women were not categorized by race in data available from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics. The identification of Hispanic prisoners solely as an ethnic variable
confounds any attempt to determine how many Hispanics were classified as Black or
White. The comparative statistics for year end 1984 and 1989 did reveal that female
Hispanic prisoners increased 17896 while the overall increase in female prisoners was
12296. See BJS, 1984, supra note 94, Tables 8 & 9 at 19, 21; BJS, 1989, supra note
11, Tables 5.8 & 5.9 at 71-72. Since 24% of female federal prisoners are currently
identified as Hispanic, it is probable that minority women are actually a majority of
females incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons given that the Bureau of Prisons
identifies 59% as White, 3996 as Black, 1% as Indian, and 1% as Asian. See 1993
INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23. A telephone conversation with Christopher A.
Imes, Research Analyst, Bureau of Prisons, confirmed that the great majority of
Hispanics Identify themselves as White when self-reporting race (May 4, 1993).
261. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table C-I. Recent
federal sentencing data which separates Hispanics from the Black and White popula-
tions shows that White females comprised 45% of those sentenced in fiscal year 1991
compared to 34% Black and 17% Hispanic females sentenced. Id In comparison, the
respective statistics for sentenced men were 450A 261A and 269. Id. The 1992 data
showed 4896 of the females as White, 34% as Black and 15% as Hispanic, compared
to the male population, which was 45% White, 27% Black, and 24% Hispanic. See
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 15. Thus, Black
women constituted a greater proportion of the sentenced female population than the
respective statistic for Black men in both years. Minorities accounted for 56% of male
and 55% of female federal offenders in 1991. The respective statistics for 1992 were
55% and 5296. This data reflects only sentenced rather than imprisoned offenders. Id.
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Black males.' Therefore, Black and Hispanic female offenders are
more likely to be disadvantaged by the inability to obtain departures
based on their status as single mothers than are White women.
The deletion of gender from alimony decisions had the unforseen re-
sult of plunging children of divorced mothers into poverty.' Likewise,
the deletion of gender from sentencing decisions often causes the com-
plete disruption of the lives of children of female offenders who are sin-
gle mothers. In divorce, the deletion of gender assumes the existence of
equal economic opportunities, contrary to the actual lower earnings of
most females. In sentencing, the deletion of gender assumes a world in
which men and women have equal custody of their children. It also envi-
sions that the noncustodial parent is willing and able to take responsibil-
ity for the care of the children. The reality is that single parents are
disproportionately mothers. When fathers are incarcerated, their wives or
former wives overwhelmingly assume the responsibility of caring for
their children. In contrast, when mothers are incarcerated, their former
husbands or lovers rarely have custody of the children and their current
male intimates often face imprisonment for the same criminal activity
involving the female.'
This asymmetry in child care arrangements has been documented. 6
The results of two surveys of women prisoners are critical in assessing
why a single mother is not "ordinary" for Section 5H1.6 purposes or
alternatively to demonstrate that the effect of her incarceration was not
contemplated by the Guidelines.' Preliminary data from a 1991 federal
262. See BJS, 1984, supra note 94, Tables 7 & 8 at 18-19 (showing Black women as
4396 of the female inmate population, and Black men as 31% of male inmate popula-
tion). See also BJS, 1989, supra note 11, Tables 5.7 & 5.8 at 70-71, showing Black
women as 3896 of the female population and Black men as 3096 of the male popula-
tion. Similarly, in 1993, Black women were 39% of the female population, while Black
men were 33% of the male population. 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23.
As already noted, the White population may be overstated as compared to the total
minority population because Hispanics were not separately identified.
263. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L REV. 1, 60-65 (1987); LENORE J. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-56 (1985); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Di-
vorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 U.C.LA. L REV. 1181, 1241-54 (1981).
264. See discussion of conspiracy cases, infra notes 450-517 and accompanying text.
265. See BJS, WOMEN, supra note 75.
266. No data isolating children from, other dependents was available from the Sen-
tencing Commission. Since any data concerning a defendant's number of children
comes from presentence reports, it is unclear whether placement of children will nec-
inmate survey indicates that forty-five percent of female inmates have
minor children'7 and that more than eighty-six percent of mothers,
compared to sixty-eight percent of fathers with minor children, lived with
those children prior to being incarcerated.' Ninety-one percent of men
and only thirty-three percent of women reported that their children now
live with the child's other parent.2m While these figures may be overstat-
ed since both men and women could report more than one location, the
alternate places designated by men totaled 119 percent, compared to a
total of 152 percent for females. Therefore, it is likely that percentage of
children living with their fathers is more exaggerated than the percentage
living with their mothers.' These results also suggest that women of-
fenders who have more than one child may have difficulty finding place-
ments that keep the children together. In other words, more than one lo-
cation is reported because children are separated. Similarly, the number
of varied locations for children of female offenders may also signify the
instability of caretaking arrangements. For example, the children may be
moved between relatives, friends or foster care. The survey also revealed
racial differences in terms of placement of children. Approximately ten
percent more White women"7 ' had children living with the child's other
parent than did Black women.'
The federal results parallel the information obtained in a nationwide
state prison survey, which found that nearly eighty percent of moth-
ers,m compared to fifty percent of fathers, lived with minor children be-
fore entering prison." More telling, nearly ninety percent of males re-
ported that their wives were caring for their children during the man's
incarceration.2 1 In contrast, twenty-two percent of women reported that
their children lived with their husbands during the woman's im-
essarily be reported unless probation officers are instructed to routinely ask for this
information.
267. April 27, 1993 BOP Responses, supra note 34, Table 1.
268. Id.
269. Id., Table 2.
270. See id. The sample was designed to be representative of the entire prison
population.
271. As previously discussed in supra note 261, this also includes most Hispanic
Women.
272. Id. Nearly 3896 of White women and 28% of Black women identified this re-
sponse.273. BJS, WOMEN, supra note 75, at 6. This is consistent with other estimates at individu-
al women's prisons. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. See also George
C. Kiser, Female Inmates and Their Families, 55 FED. PROBATION 56, 58 (1991)
(noting that the number of mothers at the Dwight Correctional Center outside Chica-
go illinois was estimated at 65% to 8896).
274. BJS, WOMEN, supra note 75, at 6.
275. Id. at 7.
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prisonment. 6 Other recent surveys found even fewer children being
cared for by their fathers, ranging from seventeen percent' to less than
eleven percent.'
When a single mother is sentenced, it is not merely her status as a
female which is relevant, but rather the gendered effect of child rearing
which causes her children to be severely disadvantaged compared to
those of male offenders. Unlike a male parent whose children will contin-
ue to live with their mother, a single mother's imprisonment is more
likely to lead 'to the total disruption of her children's lives. As Judge
Weinstein has recognized "[r]emoving the mother in such a matriarchal
setting destroys the children's main source of stability and guidance and
enhances the possibility of their engaging in destructive behavior." '
Such children will be placed with relatives, neighbors, foster care or in
an institutional setting. One study found that living arrangements for
nearly forty percent of the children whose mothers were imprisoned
changed from the initial placement and that separation from siblings oc-
curred in nearly one third of the families studied.'s On occasion, such
child placements can have disastrous consequences."
Children of incarcerated mothers have also been found to change
schools more often than children of mothers given probation, suffer a
decline in academic performance and have more behavioral problems
than the children of mothers on probation.' The negative effects of pa-
rental separation, which can include potential delinquency and criminal
behavior by children, have long been recognized.' The practical conse-
276. BJS, WOMEN, supra note 75, at 6. See also PATRICIA J. BAUNACII, MOTHERS IN
PRISON 29 (1985) (study reporting that only 2096 of children of incarcerated females
were living with their natural fathers).
277. BARBARA BLOOM & DAVID, STEINHART, supra note 33, at 24.
278. See POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 65.
279. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
280. STANTON, supra note 32, at 3940.
281. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 756 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (permitting a
downward departure because of the sudden, unexpected and inexplicable death of the
defendant's only child who was born during the mother's incarceration and later
given to her relatives).
282. STANTON, supra note 32, at 93-94. Other factors as well as incarceration com-
bined to create these problems. Id. at 94. The mother's socioeconomic status and
prior criminal record are also related to her child's development Id.
283. See, e.g., Phyllis J. Baunach, You Can't Be a Mother and Be in Prison...
Can You? Impacts of the Mother-Child Separation, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
AND WOMEN 155 (Barbara Raffel Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, 32-35 (1979); POLLocK-
quence of ignoring children at sentencing is not only that the children
become victims of their parent's crimes, but they also are more likely to
becomevictimizers of others. As Judge Weinstein has commented,
"[e]xperience in this district has demonstrated that imprisonment of a
parent tends to result in the child ending up in prison as well."' It,
makes sense to consider such children at sentencing to avoid their be-
coming the next generation of criminal defendants. How ironic it would
be if a mother's incarceration initiated her child's cycle of criminality
where the judge does not believe that incarceration of the single mother
is otherwise required to meet the goals of sentencing.' Moreover, from
a sentencing policy perspective, there is considerable evidence that fami-
ly relationships also affect the mother's rehabilitation.'
Another reality which haunts single mothers is whether their parental
rights will ultimately be terminated because of their incarceration.'l
Again, children of male prisoners usually remain with their mother,
which makes it unlikely that official termination proceedings will be
initiated. On the other hand, some twenty-eight percent of state female
prisoners who had been living with their minor children prior to incar-
ceration reported that a court had placed their children in the legal cus-
tody of others since their admission to prison.' Although most moth-
ers hoped they would be able to regain custody on their release, one
study found that some mothers voluntarily relinquished custody of their
children so that outside caretakers could act as their legal guardians and
better obtain medical and other services for the children.' Once the
state placed the child, it becomes difficult for women to retrieve them
despite their desire to regain custody.'a
One commentator observed that incarcerated mothers receive a double
punishment for their crimes: a prison sentence and the threat of termina-
tion of parental rights." Research has also shown that enforced separa-
BYRNE, supra note 6, at 65-88.
284. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1283 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1982).
286. George C. Kiser, Female Inmates and Their Families, 55 FED. PROBATION 56,
63 (1991); see C.F. Hairston, Family Ties During Imprisonment: Do they Influence
Future Criminal Activity? 62 FED. PROBATION 48 (1988).
287. See, e.g., Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. at 1290 (noting that a female defendant
may lose custody if she serves more than two years, in a case where the seriousness
of the offense warranted incarceration for three years). See generally Kathleen Haley,
Mothers Behind Bars: A Look at the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women 338,
341-46 in WOMEN, CRIME & JUSTICE (Susan K. Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds.,
1980); POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 177; STANTON, supra note 32, at 3.
288. BJS, WOMEN, supra note 76, at 7. No similar question was asked in the federal
survey.
289. BAUNACH, supra note 284, at 164.
290. POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 177.
291. Adela Beckerman, Women in Prison: The Coniflict Between Confinement and
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tion from their children has detrimental psychological consequences to
mothers, similar to those suffered in connection with a traumatic
loss.' Moreover, given the few federal facilities which house women, a
prison sentence may be served in a far flung location where family visita-
tion is almost impossible.' Interviews with incarcerated mothers found
fewer than half reported visits from children.' This was consistent
with federal inmate survey data, which disclosed that ten percent more
women than men never received visits from children, although the per-
centage of women never receiving calls or mail was six percent lower
than that of males.'s No federal prison currently permits children to
reside with their mothers.'s Relatively few community placements are
available for those women who are pregnant or have children." Thus,
while the consequences of incarceration to pregnant women and single
mothers may be foreseeable, they are not typical of the larger population
of prisoners who are parents. Nor is there the slightest evidence that the
Commission ever considered any of the types of data discussed in this
Article.
The present quandary over the feasibility of granting departures to
Parental Rights, 18 Soc. JUST. 171, 180 (1991).
292. See, e.g., RONALD B. FLOWERS, WOMEN AND CRIMINALITY 159 (1987).
293. See United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see
also STEVEN McPEEK & SHAu-FAi TsE, BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION, BUREAU OF PRISONS PARENTING PROGRAMS: USE, COST, AND BENEFITS
(1988). The report comments that the data showing that women's families lived
further away from their facilities than men's families "is not surprising since there
are fewer institutions that house women in the Federal Prison System, and, thus,
women cannot always be placed as near to their homes as male inmates." Id. at 2.
At Lexington, only 11% of females had family within 200 miles compared to 3296 of
males using the center. Id. at 12. Women also were found to use such visiting cen-
ters more than men. Id. at 5. This is consistent with information developed for the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force which found that nearly two-thirds of the
women interviewed were located more than 500 miles from their homes. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 145.
294. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 160.
295. April 27, 1993 BOP Responses, supra note 34, Table 3.
296. United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
297. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 158 & n.81 (indicating that in
the Ninth Circuit, none of the community placements permitted children); see also
Rita D. Hardy-Thompson, Community Corrections and Female Offenders, 3 FED.
PRISONS J. 6, 7 (1992) (discussing federal halfway house placements). See generally
POLLOCK-BYRNE, supra note 5, at 188 (arguing that the greatest need of women of-
fenders is for correctional alternatives that recognize the presence of children in their
lives).
pregnant women and single mothers ultimately results from the circuits
unnecessarily limiting their interpretation of the Section 5H1 factors by
defining the opposite of "ordinarily" as "extraordinarily." This language
corjures up an image of unique circumstances, rather than of circum-
stances infrequent in the larger offender population, albeit typical within
a given population such as single mothers. In commentary concerning de-
partures, the Commission uses terms such as "atypical" and "unusual" as
antonyms for ordinary.' There are other adjectives which could also
be used to describe a case as not ordinary, including uncommon and
infrequent. Clearly, single mothers are atypical of the majority of offend-
ers being sentenced. Stated in gender-neutral terminology, single parents
who at the time of their arrest have custody of children who cannot be
cared for by the other parent are not typical of the overall federal offend-
er population. Given their few numbers, pregnant offenders are even less
typical of the federal offender population. The reality is that single moth-
ers and mothers-to-be are not the average offenders. Women remain less
than twenty percent of federal offenders and less than eight percent of
the federal inmate population.' The percentage of single mothers or
pregnant offenders is even smaller, as is the number of such females
whose family units would be destroyed by their incarceration. Thus, in
the broad sense, such females are not ordinary.
In a decision construing the word exceptional, one judge noted that to
"every criminal defendant, his own case is exceptional."' This example
is equally apt when applied to single parenting; the relationship of each
single mother to her children is exceptional. The disruption of a family
unit is an extraordinary event in the lives of those affected, despite the
fact that a growing number of single mothers are being incarcerated. It is
particularly disturbing that some appellate courts have taken the position
that single parenting cannot support a departure because it is not ex-
traordinary. By so doing, the courts fail to recognize that departures are
not determined in the abstract. In an individual case, the seamless web
of interrelated facts that define the life of the single mother may well
render her not ordinary. Claiming that single parenthood is always ordi-
nary is both unrealistic and unnecessary because such a claim ignores
differences in family situations. Moreover, the claim conflicts with the
totality approach towards sentencing departures, which allows courts to
evaluate factors in combination in order to determine their "extraordi-
nary" nature.
In determining the appropriateness of a family-based departure, Judge
298. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4b.
299. 1993 INMATE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 23. The data shows that 5463 women
and 66,217 men were incarcerated as of January 1993. Id.
300. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Weinstein has recognized that the policy statement of Section 5H1.6 is
not useful because
[i]t tells us that a defendant-mother is not generally entitled to credit for her
motherhood. It does not address the more critical problem of whether the court
can consider the welfare of her child or children in determining the sentence ....
Insofar as the absence of the mother may have profoundly deleterious effects on
her child or children, their care must be relevant in considering whether there
should be incarceration or other forms of punishment."'
Similarly, Judge Merritt's dissent in United States v. Brewer,' conclud-
ed that nothing in the Guidelines or its commentary suggested that the sen-
tencing facts were taken into account in devising the Guidelines.' In
his view, the Guidelines fail to consider a judge's sentencing determina-
tion that may take into account the defendant's responsibility to raise her
young children.' Judge Merrit decried the result in Brewer which re-
versed a downward departure for a single mother as turning the
"'guidelines' into mechanistic 'rules' which will create serious injustice in
many cases in the future."' These judges clearly contemplate the alter-
native departure route by which you need not show that parenting is
extraordinary. They illustrate that the Commission did not ever consider
a departure on behalf of children.
The appropriateness of single parent departures is evident when prop-
er attention is focused on the Commission's pronouncement that it "does
not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned any-
where else in the Guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure
in an unusual case."" Admittedly, courts are required to consider any
pertinent policy statements in determining an appropriate sentence,3
and the Supreme Court has accorded significant weight to policy state-
ments and commentary.' However, the absence of any mention in Sec-
tion 5H1.6 of single parenting should not be construed as a sign that the
Commission either considered this issue or did so adequately.' In oth-
301. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
302. 899 F.2d 503, 511-15 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 498
U.s. 844 (1990).
303. Id. at 514 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 513-14 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at. 513 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
306. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, Part A § 4b.
307. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (1988).
308. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992) (Policy State-
ments); Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993) (Commentary).
309. See Marc Miller and Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics and Victim
er words, to the extent that a policy statement does not prohibit a speci-
fied action, the court is still free to interpret that statement with the
recognition that it is not subject to formal legislative review and does not
have the same degree of authority as the Guidelines.310 Moreover, since
Congress directed the courts to consider offender characteristics in de-
termining sentences, " this arguably gives judges authority to indepen-
dently evaluate the role of such characteristics regardless of the exis-
tence of any Commission policy." '
The congressional admonition that the Guidelines should reflect the
general impropriety of ordinarily considering offender characteristics was
directed "to guard against the inappropriate use of incarceration for
those defendants who lack education, employment, and stabilizing
ties."3 ' However, "each of these factors may... in an appropriate case,
call for the use of a term of probation instead of imprisonment, if con-
ditions of probation can be fashioned that will provide a needed program
to the defendant and assure the safety of the community.""4 This lan-
guage is ideally suited to permit parenting departures for nonviolent
women offenders. As the legislative history further notes, such factors
should be subjected to "intelligent and dispassionate professional analy-
sis; and on this basis to recommend, with supporting reasons, the fairest
and most effective guidelines [the Commission] can devise."31 In es-
sence, fairness can best be achieved by considering the effects of incar-
ceration upon the children of offenders who are single parents. In addi-
tion, it should be remembered that the Sentencing Reform Act directed
the Commission "to reflect to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice pro-
cess."1 ' Ignoring the wealth of information concerning single parenting,
the disruption caused to children by incarcerating a single parent, and
the rehabilitative effects of parenting violates the letter as well as the
Vulnerability: The Differences Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3 FED.
SENT. REP. 3, 5 (1990).
310. United States v. Gasdill, 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993). See also United States v.
Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1308 (2d Cir. 1993). Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE LJ. 1681, 1695 (1992).
311. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) & (a)(5) (Supp. 1992).
312. David F. Shapiro, Note, Sentencing the Reformed Addict: Departure Under The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of Drug Rehabilitation, 91 CoLUM. L
REv. 2051, 2058 (1991).
313. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3358 (discussing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L
No. 98-473).
314. Id. at 3357-58.
315. Id. at 3358.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 1992).
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spirit of the law.
Children are not new to sentencing policy. The Model Penal Code
provides that consequences to children can weigh against incarceration
when "the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hard-
ship to himself or his dependents."'7 Any cost benefit analysis would
seem to dictate that children be considered in the sentencing deci-
sion,"' particularly when societal costs regarding any future criminality
of the children are weighed."9 Even without factoring children into the
analysis, the current average cost of $56.84 per day' ° or nearly $21,000
per year for incarcerating females for crimes that society did not former-
ly view as requiring imprisonment appears unnecessary. However, the
addition of the disruption to childrens' lives to the cost-benefit analysis
should favor downward departures, even if any future criminality of the
children is regarded as purely speculative. Other societal costs that
should be considered might include foster care to replace the incarcer-
ated parent, permanent dissolution of the family when the incarceration
provides grounds for terminating parental rights, and the child's depen-
dence upon government aid."' Indeed, the economic cost of foster care
ranges between $200 and $600 for basic monthly maintenance, which
does not include other monetary assistance provided to foster children in
many states.'
There is no policy reason to prohibit downward departures to pregnant
women and single mothers. Absolutely no evidence exists that pregnant
women or single parents received any attention when the Guidelines
were formulated. Thus it seems equally implausible that the effect of in-
carceration on children of single mothers in general or minority women
in particular was considered. The only reference to family ties in the leg-
islative history is in a traditionally male context. Congress recognized
that the Commission could conclude that
a person whose offense was not extremely serious but who should be sentenced
to prison should be allowed to work during the day, while spending evenings and
317. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2)(K) (1962). Ten states have enacted this provision.
See Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant's Children at Sentencing, 2 FED. SENT.
REP. 194 n.12 (1989).
318. See, e.g., Katie & Sager, supra note 125, at 437-38.
319. Id,
320. BUDGET EXECUTION OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 1992 AVERAGE PER
CAPITA COST FIGURES.
321. Karle & Sager, supra note 125, at 437-38.
322. See AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, W-MEMo, FOSTER CARE RATES,
APRIL 1, 1993 Table 1, Foster Care Basic Monthly Maintenance Rates (in dollars).
weekends in prison, in order to be able to continue to support his family. Even
more frequently, perhaps, family ties might play a role in such matters as the
location of the prison facility in which a prisoner is to be housed, the use of fur-
lough, and the location of pre-release custody.'
While this statement would appear to permit the consideration of posi-
tive family ties in sentencing decisions, it is directed solely at male of-
fenders. The legislative history does not contemplate the single parenting
problem of women, which involves disruption to children's lives. In reali-
ty, even the statement about prisoner placement is only significant to
males since relatively few federal facilities exist that house women. This
results in women being incarcerated and furloughed to locations far from
home. Indeed, the trial judge in Pozzy T based his downward departure
in part on the absence of any nearby community-based facility that
would house a mother and her newborn child.
A specific parenting departure also does not violate the Commission's
ban on considering the offender's sex in sentencing; male single parents,
as well as male and females who have primary parenting responsibilities,
would be eligible. Moreover, the Senate Report concerning this provision
acknowledged that sex neutrality did not mandate "blindness" to this
factor. 5 Sex and race neutrality were mandated to ensure that the
Guidelines would not harm traditionally disadvantaged groups. Interpret-
ing gender neutrality in a way that harms the very group the rule was
meant to aid is a perversion of just sentencing. The cruelty imposed on
families by the failure of the sentencing matrix to weigh the effect of
incarceration on children is contrary to the spirit of Section 5H1.10. Pop-
ulation data relating to single parenting demonstrates that the practical
result of the current policy falls disproportionately on women.
As a practical matter, before the Guidelines were promulgated, judges
did consider children at sentencing.' For example, Judge Merritt has
questioned why we should now consider irrelevant the fact that the de-
fendant is a young mother who must raise several small children, when
such facts, alone and in combination, have heretofore been considered
highly relevant by sentencing judges and jurors.' Professor Daly has
noted that this type of favoritism may pose a dilemma for feminists.'
323. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3357.
324. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 S.
Ct. 943 (1990).
325. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 171 n.409 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
326. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
327. United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990).
328. Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 61, at 12-13.
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While such sentencing can reinforce traditional family roles, jettisoning
any consideration of children puts the family units of single mothers at
risk. As Professor Daly has aptly recognized, "[E]qual treatment of defen-
dants whose responsibilities for others vary and differ by gender may not
be justice."' Child rearing is primarily allocated to the mother in
today's society.'e Therefore, why should the judiciary blindly impose
equal treatment on parents, when the rest of society does not? The
disadvantage to children who may have less supervision and care has
societal costs which can outweigh any sentencing advantage. 2
The total disruption to the lives of children of single mothers makes a
mockery of so-called gender neutrality in sentencing. What we have in-
stead is a facially sex-neutral departure rule that ignores children and
fails to operate equally in the way it affects male and female offenders.
In discussing feminist jurisprudence, Professor Littleton has asserted that
the question is not whether women are different, but rather how "the
social fact of gender asymmetry can be dealt with so as to create some
symmetry in the lived-out experience of all members of the communi-
ty." In a sentencing context, this inquiry requires an investigation of
methods for neutralizing negative effects of incarceration on the children
of single mothers in order to ensure that all offenders' children will be
impacted in an approximately equal manner.
True gender neutrality in this matter requires the availability of depar-
tures for single parents whose children cannot be cared for by their oth-
er parent. Otherwise, the gendered nature of parenting roles will dictate
that such children are punished as severely as their mothers. Similarly,
many of the observations about the effect of incarceration on children of
single parents equally apply to parents with primary caretaking responsi-
bilities. In other words, in a two-household family, maintaining the
presence of the primary caretaker, usually a mother, is significant in
avoiding disruption to the child's life, even if the other spouse is not
incarcerated.' Therefore, departures should be available to parents
who are primary caretakers because their children are also disadvan-
329. Id.
330. Parisi, supra note 62, at 216.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 216-17.
333. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexua Equality, 75 CAL L. REV. 1279,
1297 (1987).
334. As previously mentioned, the parent who is the primary or sole caretaker is
typically, but not always, the female.
taged in a way that is atypical of the overall offender population.
Some will argue that the availability of such departures simply gives a
break to mothers. However, since the Guidelines have virtually ignored
women, attention to this issue is actually an attempt to devise a rational
sentencing policy for females that recognizes their separate pattern of
criminality' and family responsibilities. Termination of parental rights,
concern about disruption to their children's lives, and inferior access to
child visitation have never been viewed as criminal penalties. However, it
is unrealistic to claim that women who face such issues are being pun-
ished in a manner equal to male offenders whose children remain with
their mothers and who can more easily visit their male parent because he
is incarcerated closer to home.
While a consequence-based standard for decision-making regarding
family departures may not be an ideal approach to female sentencing in
the abstract, given the restrictions imposed by the Guidelines it is a sig-
nificant improvement over current practice. In 1992, J. Michael Quinlan,
then the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, asked, "[D]oes equal
treatment really mean treating all inmates the same? Or, rather does it
mean that their needs should be met at the same level as those of the
male offender-even if through "different" programs and services?"'
This author suggests that Sentencing Guidelines should address these
same questions.
E. How Should Children Be Factored into Sentencing Decisions?
The Sentencing Act, congressional history, and policy statements per-
mit pregnancy as well as single parenting as reasons for departure. Since
a significant number of circuits have ruled otherwise, the policy
statement and/or commentary concerning family responsibilities should
be modified. Moreover, any amendment to the Policy Statement Section
5H1.6 should specify both that a downward departure shall be granted to
single parents unless good cause exists for denying it and that primary
parenting responsibilities and pregnancy can be considered in granting a
family ties departure. In other words, single parenting departures would
become the norm rather than the exception, with pregnancy and primary
parenting responsibilities also capable of justifying a departure.
The reason that primary parenting responsibilities would not be ac-
corded the same weight as single parenting is obvious. In a two-parent
335. A number of factors are subsumed under this general description including
different entry points into crime, more victimization of females at home, different
social organization of lawbreaking, and less perceived seriousness of female offenses.
336. J. Michael Quinlan, The Female Offender: A Prologue, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 3
(Spring 1992).
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household, while the presence of both spouses is advantageous, if the
spouse who has primary parenting responsibilities is incarcerated, the
other spouse is available to keep disruption of the child's life to a mini-
mum.' However, since the spouse with primary parenting responsibili-
ties may significantly impact the child's quality of life, such departures
should regularly be available. For example, the other spouse might not
be the child's natural parent, which may affect their relationship, or the
other parent's employment may require long or irregular hours or fre-
quent travel. Similarly, if both parents are facing incarceration, the judge
should have flexibility to determine whether a departure for one or both
parents is appropriate. Since judges have discretion to stay sentences
until after birth, most pregnancy departures will actually be for parenting
reasons. However, if a pregnant woman is incarcerated pretrial, she
should be able to receive a discretionary departure at the time of her
sentencing.
An amendment to Guidelines policy and commentary is also beneficial
because of the peculiarity that a district court's discretionary refusal to
depart downward cannot be reviewed.' If the Guidelines were modi-
fied, a denial of a single parenting departure would become appealable
on the grounds that good cause to deny the departure was lacking as a
matter of law. However, under circuit courts' current guideline interpre-
tation, the extent of the departure would still be discretionary, and there-
fore not appealable.' Similarly, a discretionary denial of a departure
for pregnancy or primary parenting would also not be appealable.
If the effect of imprisonment on children is considered, this does not
mean that single mothers would automatically be given probation or
substantial departures. A variety of factors, including the seriousness of
the crime and the defendant's culpability, must be considered. In some
cases, the gravity of the offense and the need to protect the public will
outweigh the social costs of imprisoning a defendant.' Similarly, in
337. Two-parent households need not be traditional, given that single-sex couples
may have stable relationships in which they are raising children. None of the federal
offender case law concerning family ties departures has raised any sexual orientation
issues.
338. See JEFRI WOOD, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE
OF APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES 31 (1991). While Judge Becker eloquent-
ly argued in his concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Denardi, 892
F.2d 269, 272-85 (3d Cir. 1989), that appellate review should be available for plainly
unreasonable refusals to depart, this position has not garnered appellate support.
339. See WOOD, supra note 338, at 31.
340. Karle & Sager, supra note 125, at 437-38.
considering a departure for a single parent of either sex, the judge
should weigh the desirability as well as the feasibility of having the child
reside with the other parent." In addition, such departures do not per-
mit judges to depart below any applicable mandatory minimum sentence
unless the government requests a departure based on substantial assis-
tance. 2 However, given the usual property crimes committed by fe-
males and their generally minor roles in drug conspiracies, family depar-
tures should be favored for women, many of whom would not have re-
ceived any incarceration prior to the Guidelines.
Eleanor Bush has proposed a detailed structure for child based sen-
tencing decisions. She recommends that judges (1) choose the least puni-
tive sanction to achieve their sentencing purpose; (2) avoid harm to inno-
cent parties; and (3) avoid the breakup of families.' She suggests that
the parent-child relationship be assessed to determine the nature of the
relationship and the mother's parenting skills. She cautions, however,
that a judge should not question such skills unless contrary evidence ex-
ists.3' To be eligible for such a departure, a parent would have to be
living with the child at the time of arrest." It should be remembered
that being convicted of a crime does not mean that a woman is a 'bad'
mother.'
The in/out or imprisonment versus non-imprisonment decision is clear-
ly the most important issue, although children should also be considered
when selecting the form and length of an incarcerative sentence."7 Ms.
Bush cautions judges about feeling reassured that family or friends will
take the children, since the stability of many such relationships is ques-
tionable.' Alternative types of sentences such as intermittent sentenc-
ing or time in halfway houses should be considered as well as a delay of
the single parent's sentence until the child is in school."49 Since place-
341. Id.
342. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5Ki.1; MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note
63, at 53.
343. See Eleanor L. Bush, Not Ordinarily Relevant? Considering the Defendants'
Children at Sentencing, 54 FED. PROBATION 15, 17-21 (1990) [hereinafter Children].
344. Id. at 19-20.
345. Arrest, rather than sentencing, is key because children should not be further
disadvantaged if their lives have already been disrupted during the parent's pretrial
incarceration.
346. Louise Rosenkrantz & Virdia Joshua, Children of Incarcerated Parents:- A
Hidden Population, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 2. At the time the article was
written, Ms. Rosenkrantz was the Director of the Children's Center at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Pleasanton, California. The article discusses many of the
difficulties mothers face in making arrangements for children and having them visit.
347. Children, supra note 343, at 17.
348. Id. at 19.
349. Id. at 20.
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ment of the children in foster care may lead to termination of parental
rights, it militates against incarceration.'m
While Bush views any prior prison record as weighing against consid-
eration of children," Phyllis Baunach has observed that some women
may revert to crime "more out of sheer frustration or an inability to cope
with the situation than out of lack of concern for their children."' Ra-
cial stereotyping must also be avoided in considering family obligations.
For example, sentencing judges should not regard Black women as more
easily replaced than White women by female kin because of more ex-
tended women-centered domestic networks in urban poor Black fami-
lies.' The 1991 federal inmate survey disclosed that fifteen percent
more Black inmate mothers responded that their children were residing
with grandparents than did White inmate mothers.3m While it is unclear
if any of these grandparents lived in the home prior to the mother's in-
carceration, the presence of a grandparent in the home should not by
itself defeat a single parenting departure unless the circumstances indi-
cate the mother is not the primary parent. Motivation for the criminal act
should also be evaluated. In other words, if money obtained from the
crime was spent on personal necessities or for the children, this would
be more significant than if such money was spent on personal luxuries.
Even with compassionate sentencing, given the economic distress of
many single mothers, probation without drug rehabilitation,' job train-
350. Id. at 18-19.
351. Id. at 18.
352. See Baunach, supra note 284, at 166. She notes that inmate-mothers who must
find stable employment and housing often lack skills or education and must cope
with resuming, the sole care for their children after an extended absence. Id.
353. See Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 61, at 28-29.
354. April 27, 1993 BOP Responses, supra note 34, Table 2.
355. Only a few circuits permit any downward departure for a defendant's drug
rehabilitation efforts because U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.4 provides that drug de-
pendence is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the Guidelines. See United
States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 946-48 (2d Cir. 1992) (reviewing the case law). Inter-
estingly, in Maier the court affirmed a departure for a female defendant with a 14-
year history of addiction. Id. at 944-45. In the year her sentencing was deferred, she
had made progress ridding herself of addiction, had returned to school, and had ob-
tained employment. Id. at 946. The typical approach is found in United States v.
Wall, No. 91-CR677, 1992 WL 33882 (N.D. 111. 1992), which denied a departure com-
menting that while remission of addiction was commendable, it was neither extraordi-
nary or unusual. Id. at *2. In that case, the female defendant had alcoholic parents,
three biracial children, and strained family ties. Id. at *I. She had stopped using
drugs two years earlier when she realized during pregnancy the potential damage to
ing,' or childcare remains an empty promise. When little is done to
alleviate the social and economic conditions which contribute to criminal
behavior, it is foolhardy to assume that none of these women will be re-
committed or that their children will not face continued disruption. 7
Only when courts and prisons provide innovative programs to break the
criminal cycle will female offenders truly be responsible for their own
destinies and those of their children.' The virtual lack of community-
based federal facilities that accept women and their children provide
judges with little alternative but to incarcerate women or grant them de-
partures.
Yet even in the present sentencing regime, judges can make a differ-
ence. For example, Judge Weinsteins's novel sentencing in United States
v. Concepcion,' in which he sentenced twenty women convicted of
fraudulently obtaining assistance from the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children, Food Stamp and Medicaid Programs,' is an archetype
of how to provide incentives to female offenders while providing for the
stability and viability of their families. Judge Weinstein realized that
while he would have ordered incarceration of some defendants in a com-
munity treatment program with their children, he could not because no
such facilities existed in the area.' Among other sentencing alterna-
tives, he required a confession of judgment up to the amount of restitu-
tion ordered by the court as a condition of probation.' He tied credits
for restitution to paying jobs to encourage rehabilitation as well as to poten-
tially free the women from welfare dependency.' He also worked
closely with the probation' department to ensure the availability of bed
space at a community treatment center, help for the women in job place-
ment, and childcare.' He offered to stay the sentence of some women
who were illegal aliens so they could voluntarily depart the country with
her unborn child. Id. She also continued her drug-free behavior after childbirth. Id.
356. For example, in 1989, 27% of the Federal Bureau of Prisons female population,
compared with 1896 of the male population, functioned at less than an eighth-grade
level. Federal Bureau of Prisons Educational Division, Adult Basic Education Needs
and Enrollment (August 10, 1989) (on file with author). Thus, any job training for
females is hindered by their education level.
357. STANTON, supra note 32, at 123.
358. For a review of programs that reduce women's imprisonment see IMMARIGEON
& CHESNEY-LIND, supra note 130, at 14-16. See generaUly 3 FED. PRISONS J. (Spring
1992), which is devoted to the female offender.
359. 795 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
360. Id, at 1263.
361. Id. at 1283.
362. Id. at 1284.
363. Id. at 1285.
364. Id. at 1306-07.
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their children.' Obviously, the availability of greater community-based
resources and placements for the families would have been desirable.
Their unavailability, however, was not treated as an excuse to forego all
sentencing ingenuity. In contrast, too often federal judges decry the in-
flexibility of the Sentencing Guidelines without first testing their lim-
its.38
Similarly, the Department of Justice should develop policy identifying
criteria for determining whether to appeal from a trial court's decision to
grant a family-based departure. Appeals by federal prosecutors protesting
downward departures have in large measure triggered the bad case law
on single parenting. Questions of fairness should dictate limiting such
appeals to cases in which the female offender's criminal activity demands
a harsh sentence.
F. Should Bad Moms Get Upward Departures?
If good mothers get downward departures, should bad moms be given
upward departures or sentenced at the high end of the range? The few
cases that raise this question involved drug trafficking at home in the
presence of children. For example, United States v. Guerrero' af-
firmed a sentence at the high end of the range where drug trafficking
was based at home, even though the young children were typically not
present during the transactions. United States v. Shuman' held that
the defendant's wilfull inclusion of her adult son in the drug business
and permitting -his easy access to drugs justified an increased sentence
because she abused her custodial relationship. Similarly, United States v.
Ledesma' affirmed an upward adjustment where the district judge
found that "as a mother, [Ledesma] aided, abetted, facilitated, and pro-
cured her daughter into the drug world." The mother was penalized be-
cause she held a position of trust in influencing her daughter who had
recently reached the age of majority.'
365. Id. at 1303.
366. Not all judges believe that the Guidelines are as restrictive as currently per-
ceived. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the Sen-
tencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, 55 FED. PROBATION 10 (1991); Jack B.
Weinstein, Prison Need Not Be Mandatory, 28 JUDGES' J. 16 (1989).
367. 894 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1990).
368. 902 F.2d 873, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1990).
369. 979 F.2d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 1992).
370. Id. at 819.
In United States v. Thorton,3 ' distributing drugs to a minor daughter
was approved as a basis for upward departure of the defendant's crimi-
nal history category, but not for her base level offense. However,
Thorton recognized that it was improper to sentence a female because of
her lifestyle choice to continue living with her male co-conspirator.'
Similarly, an upward departure of twenty-five percent was based in part
on the use of drugs at home in front of children in United States v.
Wylie.' The clearest statement of gender expectation of mothers is
found in United States v. Sailes,' in which the trial judge refused to
grant a family ties downward departure to a female defendant, stating
that her son's involvement in drugs was due to her failure to raise him as
she should have. The judge also indicated that it was good for the chil-
dren to be separated from their mother.375
Only one case, United States v. Christopher,37 was found in which a
male was granted an upward departure based in part on being a bad
father.' Christopher, similar to Shuman and Ledesma, arose in the
Eleventh Circuit and involved adult children dealing drugs.378 To date,
any gender effect of such sentencing has not been recognized. In other
words, behavior that exposes children to the drug trade may support an
argument for increased sentencing. However, the relevant cases mainly
concern women, even though men are responsible for most drug offens-
es. Moreover, as will later be discussed, women whose mates are in-
volved in drug offenses, including selling from the home, have only one
real option if they wish to remain crime-free: breaking up their family.
It is troubling that judges often assume that the mother maintains sole
responsibility to raise her children correctly and therefore punish her for
lax parenting, while not identifying fathers or substitute fathers for the
same increased punishment, particularly when young children are in-
volved. It is hardly surprising that the only upward departure cases con-
cerning minor children were directed at mothers. Moreover, this type of
sentencing may also have a disparate effect on single mothers who live
371. 922 F.2d 1490, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 1494 n.5.
373. 919 F.2d 969, 980 (5th Cir. 1990).
374. 872 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1989).
375. Id. at 737.
376. 923 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1991).
377. A second case, United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 1991), was
located in which a father was sentenced to an upward adjustment of two months for
urging his adult son to rob another bank to obtain bail for the father. However, no
mention was made of any family justification for the departure which would have
been appropriate regardless of the identity of the person who the defendant asked to
commit the other crime.
378. 923 F.2d at 1548, 1556.
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with their children to a larger extent than do male defendants.3"
VIII. BATTERING, COERCION, DOMINANCE, AND ABUSE:
FACTORING THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN OFFENDERS
INTO GUIDELINES SENTENCING
A. Departures Baised on the Battered Woman Syndrome
A number of gender issues have emerged in the departure matrix
which involve questions of battering, coercion, dominance and abuse.
The extent to which the socialization and victimization of women can be
integrated into Guidelines sentencing is currently unclear, although it
appears that defendants who can demonstrate they suffer from the Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome' ° are more likely to fit into the departure
methodology. For example, some females may be eligible for downward
departures pursuant to Section 5K2.12 of the Guidelines. This section
provides that coercion or duress, though not amounting to a complete de-
fense, may justify the court's granting a downward departure." The
built-in limitation to this departure is that "ordinarily" coercion is suffi-
ciently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of
physical injury. In practice, departures for coercion are more significant
for females than for males, and are used more frequently by White wom-
379. BJS, WOMEN, supra note 75, at 6.
380. See generaUy, ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL (1987); CHARLES
PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL (1987); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE
HOMICIDE (1989); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
381. Coercion may also be a factor when evaluating upward adjustments. For exam-
ple, United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94 (Ist Cir. 1991), reversed upward adjust-
ments for vulnerable victim (2 points) and coercion (4 points) based on the rationale
that prostitutes hired in a Mann Act conspiracy case were single teenage mothers in
need of a job. Id, at 102-04. Sabatino found that given the Mann Act's paternalistic
attitude towards protecting vulnerable women and girls, that any upward adjustment
for vulnerability would have to be justified by evidence that the prostitutes were un-
usually vulnerable. Id. at 104. Similarly, coercion was questionable since the prosti-
tutes could and did quit. Id
The court recognized that if economic coercion justifed this departure, economic
advantage from crime would increase the punishment for every financially motivated
crime. Id. The court did not deem coercive the defendants' indifference to instances
of customers raping the prostitutes, nor did it find coercive the defendants' practice
of sending "problem" prostitutes to a violent customer. In fact, the court found that
such conduct should have persuaded the prostitutes to abandon this line of work. Id.
A disconcerting gender reference in this case described the prostitutes as "girls," even
though not all of them were teenagers. Id.
en than minority women.'
The Ninth Circuit recently dealt with several issues concerning coer-
cion of female defendants in United States v. Johnson.' Johnson rec-
ognized that "there are sets of circumstances in which gender is also a fac-
tor to be considered" in determining coercion.' Johnson considered
the defendant's vulnerability to fear, not produced by the people causing
the defendant's criminal action, as a factor to consider at the sentencing
stage.' Therefore, the fact that a defendant met the Battered Woman
Syndrome could be considered: (1) as an affirmative defense of duress
for acts of distribution included as relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3;
and (2) as evidence of incomplete duress for which the court could grant
a discretionary downward departure.'
Johnson also recognized that a downward departure for coercion
could be granted in cases where the female defendant, with effort, could
have escaped." Similarly, downward departure based on incomplete
duress was also discretionary if a defendant had "frozen fright," a syn-
drome that made her an easy victim of powerful, manipulative, and vio-
lent men, since the court could consider her subjective vulnerability.
Such coercion related not merely to entering a conspiracy, but also to
failing to leave it.' Coercion could also be considered in determining
whether to grant a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility
after the trial, so long as the defendant admitted guilt.'
Of course, since such departures are discretionary, a judge is not re-
quired to grant them. For example, in United States v. Henderson-
Durand,' a downward departure was denied despite the defendant's
claim that the informant threatened to kill her and her children.'
Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit noted, it could only review the ruling to
determine that the court understood its power to depart. Therefore, be-
382. In 1992, White women received 67% of the departures granted to females for
coercion. See May 26, 1992 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H. The data only
describes the number of departures granted and does not include the number of
departures requested. Therefore, one can only speculate whether White women are
asking for such departures in higher numbers or are more successful than minority
women in having them granted. At a minimum, this is a type of departure that de-
fense counsel should consider in appropriate cases.
383. 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992).
384. Id. at 898.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 900-01.
387. Id. at 902.
388. Id. at 903.
389. Id, at 902-03.
390. Id, at 903.
391. 985 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1993).
392. Id. at 976.
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cause the trial judge's comment that the defendant had not shown that
the crime was motivated by any coercion demonstrated that the ruling
was discretionary, the failure to depart could not be appealed. 3
Moreover, the relevant facts must be argued in a readily identifiable
departure context. For example, in United States v. Santos,' the court
showed little compassion for a woman with few options in her life, in
part due to the failure of counsel and the court to recognize how her
tragic life history related to the Guidelines structure.' The defendant
was indicted for conspiracy with her common law husband, with whom
she had two children.3 She originally agreed to cooperate and was
promised leniency. However, after she became despondent and attempt-
ed to take her own life, the government found her unfit to cooperate and
asked to have her bail revoked. ' She did provide information, but no
plea bargain was reached and she eventually was tried. Santos claimed
duress by her common law husband, who engaged in a pattern of violent
and abusive behavior towards her and her children.' A forensic psychi-
atrist testified concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome. The Judge com-
mented that "an abusive husband is no license to break the law."' She
was sentenced without any benefit of a government motion for substan-
tial departure." Although the appellate decision concerned the trial,
rather than the sentencing, it is troubling that Santos did not discuss the
ability to depart at sentencing on the basis of duress, particularly since
the defendant was sentenced for a non-violent crime. Also, an earlier
Third Circuit decision had viewed the failure of counsel to argue an ap-
propriate departure as incompetence that justified a remand for
resentencing.Y
Battering can also provide a justification for a downward departure
based on Section 5K2.10, which provides that if "the victim's wrongful
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior," the
393. Id.
394. 932 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1991).
395. Santos was sentenced to 210 months. Id. at 247. It is not clear from the
decision what portion of her sentence was required because of a statutory minimum
penalty.
396. Id. at 245-46.
397. Id. at 246.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 254.
400. Id. at 247.
401. See United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1991).
court may reduce the sentence.' For example, in United States v.
Whitetail,40 the Eight Circuit held that the fact that a jury rejected a
defense based on the Battered Woman Syndrome did not foreclose a
judge from considering a downward departure based upon the same evi-
dence; the departure is broader than the elements necessary to prove
self-defense.' In Whitetail, the defendant was charged with the sec-
ond-degree murder of her abusive live-in boyfriend. A downward depar-
ture was also affirmed in United States v. Yellow Earrings." Yellow
Earrings involved a female defendant who was charged with assault re-
sulting in serious bodily injury. The victim had tried to force himself on
the defendant and was rebuffed. When he then verbally abused and hu-
miliated her, she knifed him."s In contrast, the Eighth circuit has been
unwilling to permit downward departures based on the victim's conduct
in cases in which causal relationship to the crime is more remote. For
example, United States v. Desormeaux"7 vacated the downward depar-
ture of a female defendant who assaulted a woman her boyfriend was
dating." The appellate court disregarded the defendant's low self-es-
teem, which was a product of abusive relationships with males. The
court reasoned that while her mental condition could be a factor in sen-
tencing within the Guidelines, it was not relevant in determining whether
a sentence should be outside the range."
B. Departures Based on Dominance and Psychological Abuse
While battered women have fought their way into the case law,"'
many of the relationships that ensnare female offenders in criminal be-
havior do not present as compelling stories. While it may be stereotypical
to assume that men lead women astray, and therefore women are not
fully responsible for their criminal offenses, one federal prison warden
402. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.10.
403. 956 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1992).
404. Id. at 863-64.
405. 891 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1989).
406. 1d. at 651.
407. 952 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1991).
408. 1d at 183-84.
409. Id. at 185. This is consistent with the Eighth Circuit's holding in United States
v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1990), which presented this issue in the opposite
genider order. In Shorit, a male constructed a bomb .to kill his wife's lover. The court
found that neither the defendant's family circumstances nor the victim's adultery war-
ranted departure. Weighing "proportionality,* the court stated that adultery did not
justify "blowing up the adulterers or building a bomb capable of doing so." Id. at
1328.
410. See also United States v. Mickens, 977 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing
that departure could be granted to a battered wife).
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has observed, "Females who make their way to prison have been social-
ized more toward dependent relationships, as opposed to life activities
that promote independence.""' Thus, a number of women offenders
whose circumstances do not fit the classic definition of physical coercion
appear to be dominated by a male with whom they have a relation-
ship. 12 In one case the judge described a woman as being under the
"Svengali" spell of her boyfriend.413 Only if judges can move beyond co-
ercion to dominance in considering departures will culpability questions
be dealt with in a way that recognizes the gendered nature of some fe-
male crime.
In United States v. Gaviria,1 Judge Weinstein recently ordered a
downward departure for a woman whose history established a pattern of
dependence due to male control from a combination of physical and
psychological abuse, cultural norms, economic dependence and other
factors. He observed, "Nowhere in the Guidelines' formulaic mechanism
is there room to consider how the facts of the life of a woman abused in
this fashion should bear upon her sentence." ' Justification for the de-
parture was alternatively based upon the authority of Section 5K2.12"'
or independently upon Congress's directives in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,7 or
411. David W. Helman, "Constants" and "Contrasts," Managing Female Inmates, 3
FED. PRISONS J. 55, 57 (1992).
412. These cases clearly pose theoretical difficulties for feminists who do not want
to encourage the use of stereotypical thinking about male/female relationships. How-
ever, given the reality facing many women offenders, it would be a hollow victory to
deny them appropriate downward adjustments based on an idealized view of sexual
equality that is nonexistent in their lives.
413. Henry Weinstein, Judge Sticks to His Guns, Gives Robber Same Term as
Before, LA. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at B3. The article reported that the judge's remarks,
in which he declared that women are soft touches for clever men if sex is involved,
caused a storm of protests. The sweeping nature of the judge's comments no doubt
were responsible for the criticism. Actually, the particular facts did support a depar-
ture with no need for stereotyping. A psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant
reported that she told him her boyfriend beat her and threatened her into committing
the robberies with him. Thus, this departure should have easily fit into a classic
coercion framework if the judge had not focused on dominance.
414. 804 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
415. Id, at 479.
416. Section 5K2.12 refers to coercion or duress not amounting to a complete
defense. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.12.
417. Section 3553(a)(2) states in part that the sentence should "provide just punish-
ment for the offense" and "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § 3553(a)(2).
upon both.18 Gaviria also recognized that women in traditional cul-
tures are particularly susceptible to patterns of dependence, domination,
and victimization."" Thus, the court noted that the Commission's state-
ment on bias found in Section 5H1.10 should not be interpreted expan-
sively to deny the effects of gender on relevant and appropriate sentenc-
ing criteria.'
Coercion not reaching the level of battering was also recognized as a
legitimate departure factor in United States v. Cheape."I In Cheape, a
female defendant argued her male co-defendants coerced her to engage
in a robbery.' The female offender had a three-year relationship with
one of her co-defendants and claimed that another co-defendant had held
a gun to her head. Although the trial judge indicated that the woman had
been unfairly used by her co-defendants, he did not grant a downward
departure.' Since it was unclear whether the judge understood it was
within his discretion to depart, the case was remanded. Similarly, in
United States v. Naylor,' the late Judge Devitt departed downward by
ten years in sentencing a young woman who had a clean record except
for a minor shoplifting incident, was a good student, was active in the
community, and was gainfully employed until she became romantically
involved with her older male co-defendant who used his romantic rela-
tionship and age to manipulate her.'
Obviously, not every argument of dominance or battered woman status
will result in a departure. First, the decision to depart is discretionary.
Second, a factual predicate will have to be established before the court
exercises its discretion.' Third, such departures will often need expert
testimony in order to demonstrate that the female offender suffered from
418. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. at 480.
419. Id. at 479-80.
420. Id. at 479-80 (citing, among others, Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception,
World Traveling and Multicultural Feminism, 23 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L REv. 189
(1992); Eugene Robinson, Women in Latin America Advance Amid Stereotypes,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 29, 1992, at A26; and Evelyn P. Stevens, Marianismo: The Other
Face of Machismo in Latin America, in FEMALE AND MALE IN LATIN AMERICA 95
(Ann Pescateilo ed., 1973)).
421. 889 F.2d 477, 478-80 (3d Cir. 1989).
422. Id. at 478. She was in the back seat of the intended getaway car in the park-
ing lot during the robbery.
423. Id. at 479.
424. 735 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1990).
425. Id. at 929.
426. See United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
duress defense based on the battered woman syndrome was unavailable to a divorced
woman whose monitored telephone conversations with her ex-husband were not
threatening and who indicated no concern over his reaction to her lack of coopera-
tion with him).
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the particular condition used to justify the departure. Finally, courts are
not always receptive to reducing sentences based on coercion or domi-
nance. In United States v. Nelson,' a husband's threats of physical vio-
lence led the judge to give a two-level rather than three-level en-
hancement to the female defendant for being a manager or supervisor of
a drug conspiracy and "only" a two-credit enhancement for obstruction
of justice."' One might ask why coercion did not defeat any enhance-
ment or justify a downward departure. Clearly, many judges have little
sympathy for females in relationships with bad men.
Sometimes mental and emotional conditions having gender overtones
are considered in relation to Guidelines Section 5H1.3, which provides
that such conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the Guidelines. Several circuits have recog-
nized that psychological abuse falls within Section 5H1.3.' For exam-
ple, United States v. Roe' held that female's extraordinary history of
childhood physical, sexual, and mental abuse and neglect could justify a
downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines."' Roe observed
that the psychological effects of child abuse manifest themselves in a
variety of ways, which may include the victim experiencing profound
feelings of inadequacy and low self-esteem.' Therefore, where the
medical experts agreed that the defendant's abuse was exceptional, turn-
ing her into "virtually a mindless puppet," it was error for the trial court
to find her abuse was not extraordinary.' The case was remanded for
the trial court to determine whether to exercise its discretion by granting
a departure.' Similarly, United States v. M.B.' granted a downward
departure based on the female's motives, lifelong victimization, and her
reality as an abused woman. The interaction of her childhood sexual vic-
timization and her organic personality disorder were a contributory
427. 740 F. Supp. 1502 (D. Kan. 1990).
428. Id. at 1513-17, 1514 n.20.
429. See, e.g., United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 214 (1991); United
States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991).
430. 976 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1992).
431. Id. at 1218.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. The court also suggested that her unstable childhood could justify a depar-
ture on the basis of lack of youthful guidance. Id. However, this departure is no
longer available. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.12.
435. 809 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.N.J. 1993).
cause of her embezzling money to avoid her husband's potential abuse
when she did not obtain a bank loan.
Not every circuit is eager to accept such departures even in the face of
expert testimony indicating that the female offender suffers from the
mental or emotional condition being cited as the reason for departure.
For example, United States v. Perkins' remanded a case in which the
trial judge had ordered a departure for a female suffering from depen-
dent personality disorder. Perkins noted that a causal element must be
shown between the illness and the offense to justify a departure. 7 In
United States v. Vela," childhood sexual abuse and a shocking family
life did not constitute an extraordinary mental and emotional condition.
While the court agreed that the offender's family life was abusive, it did
not cause her to participate in the heroin conspiracy. Thus, this back-
ground did not support a downward departure in sentencing.' Similar-
ly, the Eighth Circuit reversed a downward departure based on spousal
abuse, where the abuse occurred several years before the offense and
was not caused by the victim." The Seventh Circuit has also reversed a
departure where there was no indication that the female's condition re-
suited in a significantly reduced mental capacity at the time of the of-
fense."'
Moreover, Section 5K2.13 restricts the ability to depart based on di-
minished capacity unless the defendant committed a non-violent offense
while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity, not resulting
from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants. 2 Thus in United
States v. Poff,' a woman who wrote threatening letters to the Presi-
dent was denied a departure because that crime was considered violent.
Her problem arose because her father had sexually abused her over a
long period. This resulted in her intermittent commitment to psychiatric
institutions."' One symptom of her mental illness was to threaten pub-
lic officials, thinking her father wanted her to do so. The repercussion of
this unfortunate habit was her classification as a career offender."5
While the dissent observed that she was still a victim of her father's
436. 963 F.2d 1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
437. Id. at 1526-27.
438. 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991).
439. Id.
440. United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991).
441. United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 1992). In addition, the
trial court's finding that incarcerating the female offender would be useless could not
justify a departure because it was not linked to the Guidelines structure. Id. at 1231.
442. Id. at 1230, citing U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
443. 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 96 (1991).
444. Id, at 590.
445. Id. at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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abuse,"' one could equally assert that she was also a victim of a restric-
tive reading of the Sentencing Guidelines.""
The Guidelines give relatively little recognition to the victimization of
females that fosters their entry into criminality. To the extent that depar-
tures for mental and emotional conditions or diminished capacity are
being granted to females, they are primarily received by White wom-
en."4
IX. WOMEN AS CO-CONSPIRATORS: FACTORING THE SOCIALIZATION OF
WOMEN OFFENDERS INTO GUIDELINES SENTENCING
A. The Gendered Role of Women in Conspiracies
The most troubling gender questions concerning female offenders are
raised by simply reading the published facts of many drug cases, includ-
ing those mentioned throughout this Article, which identify women by
their relationships with men."9 Such females are typically married to,
living with, or intimately involved with males who are described as being
central to the conspiracies in question. In contrast, the women often
have relatively minor roles in the conspiracies: facilitating drug deals by
446. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
447. United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rejected the
Poff analysis, concluding that since the defendant neither intended nor was able to
carry out her threats, her crime was in fact a "non-violent offense."
448. See March 17, 1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-2H. White women
received 76% of the female § 5HI.3 departures and 71% of the diminished capacity
departures.
449. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1443 (4th Cir. 1990) (convicting
female defendant for conspiracy to distribute cocaine on the basis of her traveling
with her boyfriend, an alleged drug dealer); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 972
(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that although the male conspirator had agreed to plead guilty
only if the female's name was omitted from each count, such omission did not pre-
vent female's conviction).
Not all such cases raise' sentencing guidelines issues. For example, in Zafiro v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993), a decision rejecting the proposition that sever-
ance is required as a matter of law when codefendants present mutually exclusive
defenses, the Supreme Court noted that Zafiro's unsuccessful defense was, that she
was merely the girlfriend of one of the defendants and had no idea that the suitcase
he stored in her apartment contained drugs. Id. at 936. See also United States v.
Branch, 989 F.2d 752, 754-56 (5th Cir. 1993) (crack cocaine found in diaper bag in a
room the defendant shared with her "husband" (quotes in original) and child. Defen-
dant claimed she had no knowledge of the other defendants' activities or that co-
caine was in her diaper bag, but evidence suggested that she and her family were
used as a cover for drug distribution).
answering the telephone, opening the door, or acting as couriers for their
male intimates. While the mate of a white-collar criminal may be shielded
from his crime in the suites, the live-in companion of a drug dealer who
sells his wares on the streets or at home is not equally sheltered. Mere
presence is easily converted to membership in a conspiracy by the num-
ber of ways in which women have been socialized to further their rela-
tionships with men. Thus, indigent women can become active partici-
pants in crime by permitting drugs in the home, answering the door or
the telephone, and by giving or bringing contraband to buyers.
Given the nature of such women's relationships, unless a female leaves
her mate who is dealing drugs, it may be difficult for her to totally disas-
sociate herself from the conspiracy. In other words, she is likely to be
aware of his criminal endeavors and familial actions on her part often
promote his criminal activities. Undoubtedly, such females do receive the
benefit of drug money, and have enough involvement with illicit activity
to be charged and convicted of crime. However, while the mates of drug
dealers and mates of men accused of white-collar crime equally receive
the benefits of tainted money, mates of drug dealers usually live at the
scene of criminal activity. Therefore, some women who are poor may be
sucked into crime, whereas richer women who associate with white-col-
lar felons do not face sacrificing their relationships in order to remain
crime-free.
The interaction between class and gender can be observed in United
States v. Pozzy,' in which the wife appeared to have little to do with
her husband's drug business beyond enjoying its financial benefits. The
trial court granted a departure based on Section 5K2.12, which permits
coercion to justify a lesser sentence.45" ' The court found that the wife
became an abettor by default, having no alternative but to stay or leave
when her husband dealt drugs."' In contrast, the First Circuit reversed
the departure on the grounds that coercion does not exist merely be-
cause of the marital relationship.' However, Pozzy did recognize that a
departure might still be available on the grounds the wife was a minor
participant.'
The interrelationship of gender to crime and sentencing is fairly com-
plex in such situations and raises a -number of policy questions. When
charging conspiracies, how do prosecutors determine which women to
arrest? Are some women really arrested to provide leverage for plea
bargaining with the more culpable male, either to provide information
450. 902 F.2d 133, 135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 353 (1990).
451. Id. at 137.
452. Id. at 136-37.
453. Id. at 138-39.
454. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 3B1.2(b).
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and testimony in exchange for immunity, or to be dismissed in exchange
for the male's plea?'s Since decisions concerning the nature of the
charge and plea bargaining rest with the prosecutor, gender questions
concerning a woman's culpability are often not raised at the appellate
level because evidence supporting the verdict will always exist. For ex-
ample, one female defendant who moved to Minneapolis to marry her
male codefendant claimed she had no criminal intent to join the conspir-
acy, but found herself counting money and writing messages for him."'
Large quantities of drugs and money were found in their residence and
she admitted to maintaining ledgers."7 Needless to say, the jury convict-
ed her. Similarly, another women who pleaded guilty to a drug conspira-
cy agreed to accompany her boyfriend of five years on a drug buy and
carry the purchase money.'s While she claimed it was the first time she
had actively participated in his drug dealing, she admitted that for two
years she suspected his illegal earnings were drug-related.'
It is obvious that such women are not really innocent. However, unless
the prosecutor permits them to plead to lesser offenses, they become
subject to long mandatory minimums which are disproportionate to their
culpability as a member of the conspiracy. Men can similarly show cir-
cumstances in which they are given sentences that have no relationship
to their activities in a conspiracy, but such arguments will depend on the
facts in a given case rather than on gender-based role patterns. Thus, the
prosecutors' control of substantial assistance departures is key, since
they provide the only escape below the statutory requirement. Therefore,
it is important to ask whether it is easier or more difficult for'a female to
be granted a departure for substantial assistance than her male co-con-
spirator. Does a male have to provide names of other individuals, while a
female must be cooperative to obtain such a departure, or is the woman
who has little information because of her peripheral role not likely to
455. In United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1992), a family business
white collar crime case, the wife claimed the' government coerced her into pleading
guilty by threatening that if she did not agree to a bargain, her husband would not
be allowed to enter a plea. The court noted that the government could appropriately
bargain for a package deal as part of the plea, provided that the defendant's decision
to forego a trial was overwise voluntary. Id. at 1426. However, it did not assess the
Implied coercion of a package deal in a husband-wife context, particularly in light of
traditional gender roles.
456. United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 1992).
457. Id.
458. United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
459. Id.
receive a departure and escape the applicable mandatory minimum?
B. Plea Bargaining and Substantial Assistance Departures
The statistical information regarding plea bargains and substantial
assistance departures provides no clear answers about how well women
actually fare in obtaining reduced sentences in their gendered roles as
co-conspirators. While Sentencing Guidelines statistics reveal the likeli-
hood of significant charge bargaining by female drug offenders,' they
do not reveal whether a number of such women were overcharged when
they were originally arrested. Some defense counsel perceive that in
prior years a number of women living with male co-conspirators would
not even have been arrested, let alone sentenced to prison. Undoubtedly,
the government generally realizes the peripheral roles of many females in
conspiracies. For example, in 1989 and 1990 women were sentenced for
nearly fifteen percent of all drug offenses, but comprised nearly twenty-
five percent of the people who were sentenced for the lesser drug crimes
of simple possession and communication facilitation."' This result reoc-
curred in both 1991 and 1992, with women forming thirteen percent of
drug offenders, but twenty-one to twenty-two percent of those pleading
to lesser crimes.'
Viewing substantial assistance departures produces equally murky
results. While substantial assistance is the primary reason for all down-
ward departures, such departures form a larger percentage of all depar-
tures given to males than to females.' For example, in 1991 and 1992
substantial assistance respectively accounted for sixty-eight and seventy-
three percent of male departures and only sixty-two and sixty-five per-
cent of female departures.' These percentages vary more dramatically
when race is factored into the equation. For example, in 1991 seventy-
two percent of White males versus sixty-two percent of White females
receive substantial assistance departures,' while in 1992, sixty-eight
percent of White males versus fifty-five percent of White females re-
ceived such departures. Similarly, in 1991 seventy-seven percent of depar-
tures for Black males were for substantial assistance compared with six-
ty-seven percent of Black females, while in 1992 these figures were re-
460. See DECEMBER 1991 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, Table 7.
461. Id.
462. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table 17 and
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 13.
463. See May 26, 1992 and March 17, 1993 SC Responses, supra note 3, Tables 2A-
2H. Conversely, women appear to do better than men in receiving other departures.
464. See id.
465. See id., Tables 2-A & 2-B.
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spectively seventy-five percent and sixty-six percent.'s In 1992, the per-
centage of female substantial assistance departures was slightly less than
their proportion of the sentenced population.' Hispanic women receive
more than their share of substantial assistance departures, while Black
women receive slightly fewer departures."s The gender information for
White women shows varying results, with their receiving more depar-
tures in 1991 and fewer in 1992 than their proportionate share of female
departures.' The problem in interpreting this data is that we know
nothing about the individual cases to conclude whether women in similar
circumstances are being treated equally, both in relation to the total
female population and the total male population.
It is evident that substantial assistance departures are being used as a
significant plea bargaining tool, since they have swelled from approxi-
mately 1200 departures in 1989 to 5442 in 1992 or more than a fourfold
increase in four years.' Even the 1991 to 1992 jump of more than 3000,
or a forty-five percent increase, 7' cannot be dismissed as simply reflect-
ing an enlarged sentenced population since the influx of an additional
4839 prisoners increased the entire population by only fifteen percent."
The likely explanation for their burgeoning growth is that they function
as the mechanism by which prosecutors are keeping the federal criminal
justice system afloat. In other words, the predicted flood of trials
logjamniing the system has not occurred because prosecutors are able to
avoid restictions imposed by mandatory minimum statutes and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines via substantial assistance departures.' Yet if women
are minor players in conspiracies, one might expect to see that females
would account for more than fifteen percent of such departures. Instead,
the peripherality of women based on their gender roles may actually
466. See id., Tables 2-C & 2-D.
467. See iL, Tables 1-B, 2-A & 2-H. In 1992, women received 15% of the substantial
assistance departures and were just. over 16% of the sentenced population.
468. Id., Tables 1-B. Black women receive approximately three percent less, while
White and Hispanic women each receive approximately two percent more than their
proportion in the sentenced population. Id.
469. Id., Tables 2A.
470. Compare UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTS for 1989 (Ta-
ble IX), 1990 (Table R), 1991 (Table 54) and 1992 (Table 49).
471. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNIUAL REPORT Table 54 and
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 49.
472. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1991 ANNUAL REPORT Table C-I and
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1992 ANNUAL REPORT Table 15.
473. See also Nagel and Schulhofer, supra note 123.
place them at a disadvantage in obtaining the only departure permitting a
judge to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
The ability to depart below the mandatory minimum also arises in
cases where young females, often pregnant or with small children, are
recruited as drug couriers, or mules, often for a single transaction. Such
women are recruited primarily because of gender reasons. In other
words, they are viewed as less readily identifiable as potential drug run-
ners and not likely to obtain information central to the conspiracy. This
issue arose in United States v. Delgado-Cardenas,7 in which the trial
judge raised due process and equal protection concerns when he granted
a female a downward departure below the statutory minimum for sub-
stantial assistance in the absence of any motion from the government."
He was troubled by the ability of the woman to provide successful infor-
mation for the government. "6 The appellate court remanded for the trial
judge to clarify the legal basis of its sentencing decision,' " noting that
Wade v. United Statesm permitted the review of a prosecutor's refusal
to file a substantial assistance motion if based upon an unconstitutional
motive.
In United States v. Floyd," in assessing the contribution of a female
offender, the trial judge was also concerned that the "remorseful, but
marginally culpable" defendant may not know enough to be able to assist
the prosecution.' ° Similarly, in United States v. Tannis," Judge
Higginbotham questioned the unnecessary harshness of a mandatory min-
imum sentence of ten years for a twenty-one-year-old first offender with
a one-year-old child. Her role in the drug conspiracy was as a courier,
unlinked to the main drug organization.' However, since the govern-
ment did not file a departure motion for substantial assistance, he might
well have asked how such a young female could provide information en-
titling her to a sentence below the mandatory minimum. While the Sen-
tencing Commission has recently proposed a departure for defendants
whose offense level overrepresents their culpability, such a departure is
both discretionary and does not permit the court to depart below any
applicable mandatory minimum.' At least one United States Attorney's
474. 974 F.2d 123, 125 (th Cir. 1992).
475. Id, at 124-25.
476. Id. at 125.
477. Id. at 126. The Wade decision was not available to the judge at the time of
sentencing.
478. 112 S. Ct. 1840, 184344 (1992).
479. 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (D. Minn. 1990).
480. Id.
481. 942 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1991) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
482. Id. at 198 (Hlgginbotham, J., concurring).
483. 58 Fed. Reg. 27154-55 (proposed May 6, 1993) (Proposed Application Note 16
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office appears to be deliberately undercharging mules in order to avoid
harsh mandatory minimums.'
United States v. CaI/e' is a decision that exemplifies many of the
issues being discussed. Two females escorted the male conspirator on
drug delivery trips to translate, register at the hotel and provide compan-
ionship. One, Mrs. Grisales, the wife of the male and the mother of their
three-year-old child, had previously left him because of his criminal life-
style. She returned when he assured her he would forsake illegal activity.
Instead, her continued involvement in his drug trafficking operations was
motivated by the fact that he took their child, and threatened that she
would not see the child again unless she participated. Since the govern-
ment moved to permit Mrs. Grisales a departure based upon her substan-
tial assistance, the court sentenced her well below the statutory mini-
mum, also departing downward based on her family circumstances, du-
ress, and minimal role in the conspiracy. Similarly, the male who was the
primary defendant was the beneficiary of a Section 5K1.1 departure.
In contrast, since the government did not request any substantial as-
sistance departure for the other female, whose role was equally minimal,
the court was required to apply the mandatory minimum of ten years,
which was described by the court as "so completely disproportionate to
the realities of the proceeding as to shock the conscience of the
Court."' Yet it is unlikely that the government offered the other female
an equally favorable plea bargain since unlike the others she was con-
victed by a jury, rather than pleading guilty. Certainly, the other female
who had no criminal record, a stable employment history, and family ties
and who is described as having an equally minimal role as Mrs. Grisales
would appear as appealing a candidate for a sentencing reduction.
While the effect of gender on the use of the Section 5K1. 1 departure in
this case is unclear, the fortuity of the departure is evident. We will nev-
er know whether the wife was really granted the departure as a way of
ensuring the husband's participation in identifying other members of the
conspiracy, whether she had enough information to justify a departure,
or whether she simply appeared deserving enough to warrant a sentence
below the mandatory minimum. The government simply represented that
to Commentary of Section 2D1.1).
484. Daniel Wise, Prosecutors End-Run Guidelines, NAT'L LJ.; June 21, 1993, at 3,
18.
485. 796 F. Supp. 853, 861 (D. Md. 1992).
486. Id. at 861 n.7.
she "endeavored to provide such assistance as she could." 7 This hardly
appears as a ringing endorsement of her usefulness to the prosecution.
At present, a number of Circuits recognize that judges are not bound by
the government's wishes as to the extent of the substantial assistance de-
parture.' However, few sentencing judges appear to request detailed
factors that would permit them to evaluate the basis of the government's
motion. Ironically, several Circuits have refused to permit judges to con-
sider family ties in relation to the substantial assistance departure.'
C. Minimal and Minor Role Departures
Determining the extent of a female's criminal culpability also comes
directly into play in assigning minimal or minor role status for purposes
of downward departures in drug conspiracies pursuant to Section 3B1.2
of the Guidelines.' It is hardly accidental that the Bureau of Justice
Statistics defines persons having a "peripheral" role in the offense to
include a "girlfriend, spouse, or courier with little knowledge of the drug
activity.""0 Indeed, it is well recognized that women are "bit players in
the male world of crime," in part due to the sexism of the male criminal
underworld. ' However, the commentary to Section 3B1.2 implies that
minimal participant departures should be used infrequently and in situa-
tions involving only a single transaction. Since most drug conspiracies
are ongoing by their very nature, women who are associated with male con-
spirators appear excluded from this definition. For example, U.S. v.
Madera-Gallegos' held that a wife who retrieved a heroin sample for
her husband was properly denied a four-level minimal role departure,
even though the government had recommended that reduction by stipula-
tion.' The trial judge's two-level departure was upheld based on the
husband's stating that his wife was his partner, that they kept the gram
487. Id. at 862.
488. United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993) (and cases cited
therein).
489. See United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 106-07 (Ist Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992); United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 528-29 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
490. Not all cases are drug conspiracies. For example, United States v. Wilson, 955
F.2d 547 (8th Cr. 1992), involved a conspiracy concerning stolen property. A female
defendant involved with male conspirators was refused a minor participant role be-
cause she stored stolen property at her house for the main conspirator. Id. at 551.
The government opposed the departure because of the defendant's long-term rela-
tionship with the main male co-conspirator. Id.
491. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
Table 5.43, n. I at 542 (1991).
492. ANNE CAMPBELL, THE GIRLS IN THE GANG 280 (2d ed. 1991).
493. 945 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1991).
494. Id. at 268-69.
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scale in the cupboard by the Mazola, and that his wife retrieved the
drugs in question and came back with the sample.' United States v.
Hall" is another example of a drug dealer's live-in mate who handled
money to obtain items for which identification was needed. While she
requested a three-level reduction falling between a minor and minimal
participant, her two-level reduction was found not to be clear error.'
A minor rather than minimal participant departure was also affirmed in
United States v. Tabares," where a couple was selling cocaine from
home.' The woman leased the apartment and both made rent pay-
ments.'u Since the drugs were in plain view and cash was readily acces-
sible, she was not considered a minimal participant." One poignant
note about the case that is not developed is that the woman repeatedly
told police to get out of her baby's room.' There is no way of knowing
whether she would have been able to argue dominance. As with other
cases, she clearly knew of the drug dealing.
Sometimes, lawyers even fail to request such departures. In United
States v. Headley,' in which a wife's role in the conspiracy was limited
to delivering drugs on several occasions, and whose five children had
been fathered by the leader of the drug organization,' the court re-
manded the case based on incompetence of counsel because no argu-
ment as to her minor role had been raised before the trial judge.' On
the other hand, in United States v. Sailes,a the wife's sentence was al-
most as harsh as that of her husband, who played a much greater role in
the drug activity. In some cases, police investigative methods can result
in much longer sentences than would otherwise be available. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Floyd,"7 in order to identify a woman's supplier,
495. Id. at 269.
496. 949 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1991).
497. Id. at 248-49.
498. 951 F.2d 405 (lst Cir. 1991).
499. Id. at 407.
500. Id. at 408.
501. Id. at 410.
502. Id. at 409.
503. 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991).
504. This description of the wife's relationship was employed in United States v.
Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1993).
505. Headley, 923 F.2d at 1082.
506. 872 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1989).
507. 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minn. 1990). Floyd approved a downward departure for
substantial assistance, defendant's "extraordinary turnaround," and defendant's need to
care for and supervise her young children. Id. at 1261.
the officials kept making transactions with her which then added to cu-
mulative weight of drugs for which she was sentenced.'
United States v. DiIorio' is a particularly troubling case that demon-
strates how gender factors are ignored by the current departure matrix.
The trial judge granted a three-level departure for being in between a
minimal and minor participant; however, he refused to grant her a fur-
ther departure based on her personal circumstances.61 ° The defendant
claimed that her early severe disfigurement left her scarred mentally and
physically."' When she became romantically involved with her codefen-
dant, her love for him blinded her to his conduct."'1 She had long recon-
structive surgery and was employed for the previous four years."1 3 The
trial judge remarked that applying guidelines gave him great personal
anguish, saying, "If I came on this bench as a free agent today, this lady
would not go to jail because I believe her story.""' However, he denied
any departure because her condition was not extraordinary."" Similarly,
she was not a minimal participant because she was aware of her
codefendant's continuing activities and counted money for him."' While
the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial judge believed he could
not depart, the First Circuit considered that the judge had exercised his
discretion and simply concluded her case was not extraordinary."7 In
other words, breast beating by the trial judge about the effects of the
Guidelines was considered an exercise of discretion, not a clear state-
ment that the judge had no discretion to depart.1 8 It is unfortunate that
the defendant did not also rely on imperfect coercion and dominance in
addition to extraordinary circumstances to justify any additional depar-
ture. Cases such as these must be argued by relying on a combination of
factors. Undoubtedly, when defending women who are bound to one of
their male conspirators, lawyers must consider how to weave the varying
departure rationales into a theme which supports the greatest permissi-
ble departure.
508. Id. at 1260-61.
509. 948 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991).
510. Id at 3.
511. Id. at 4.
512. Id.
513. Id,
514. Id. at 8.
516. Id. at 9.
516. Id. at 5.
517. Id at 9.
518. Id. at 5.
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D. Other Sentencing Issues Concerning Drug Couriers
To the extent that women are simply mules or couriers in drug con-
spiracies, should they be considered minimal participants? In United
States v. Cacho,'9 the fact that a mother of four small children was a
mule did not entitle her to a departure as either a minimal or minor par-
ticipant in the conspiracy.' Similarly, in United States v. Martinez,"'
the denial of a minimal role adjustment was affirmed where the female
passenger in a car containing twenty kilograms of cocaine claimed that
she was a courier in a transaction necessarily involving numerous other
individuals. The court reasoned that the amount of narcotics runs
counter to the commentary accompanying Section 3B1.2, which states
that a downward adjustment should be used infrequently.'
At the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit recently considered
the question of discriminatory charging of male drug couriers who al-
leged they were not treated as favorably by the United States Attorney as
were similarly situated females. In United States v. Redondo Lemos,'
the court held that once a prima facie showing of prosecutorial gender-
based discrimination is shown in the plea bargaining process, the district
court has the authority to determine whether a discriminating purpose motivat-
ed the prosecutor in charging the defendant before the court.' If un-
constitutional selective prosecution had occurred, a defendant could
appropriately be given the plea bargain he would have received but for
the discrimination.' The case was remanded to determine if an intent
to discriminate existed on the part of the prosecutor.
E. Upward Departures for Female Co-Conspirators
A final issue in conpiracy cases relates to granting upward departures
to women. Given the cultural and social factors that face women who
become involved in drug cases, courts should be cautious in upholding
upward departures in cases in which a wife, originally charged with con-
519. 951 F.2d 308 (11th Cir. 1992).
520. Id. at 311.
521. 983 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1992).
522. Id. at 977.
523. 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992).
524. Id, at 1301.
525. Id. at 1302-03.
526. Id at 1303.
spiracy, pleads guilty to a lesser drug crime. Thus, cases such as United
States v. Crawford' should be read with care. Crawford affirmed the
trial court's inclusion of the total amount of drugs relevant to the con-
spiracy as justifying a wife's upward departure for simple possession.'
Of course, in a particular case the wife's extensive role in a conspiracy
may justify an upward adjustment.' While most of the female offend-
ers discussed in this Article exhibit behavior patterns that are character-
ized by their gender, it would be unrealistic to suggest that all women of-
fenders are so defined. Although gender roles should be considered in
determining the extent of a female's culpability, they should not be fol-
lowed blindly when they are contradicted by facts demonstrating that the
particular female offender's criminality was not affected by gender con-
siderations. However, the effects of socialization should not easily be dis-
regarded, unless clearly warranted by the evidence.
Generally, it is difficult to draw a principled line defining how women
should be sentenced in drug conspiracies when their role is really one of
facilitation based on their socialization. Such women do not exhibit du-
ress in the classic sense, but in many cases little doubt exists that their
involvement in crime revolves around their efforts to accommodate their
male intimates. Should these women be the beneficiaries of a modern-
day paternalism, or does factoring their socialization and/or victimization
into the departure mix merely acknowledge the reality of many female
offender's lives? Professor Scales has identified domination, disadvan-
tage, and disempowerment as the real issues generally facing women.'
Translating this to a sentencing context, it becomes evident that any
attempt to gender neutralize the Guidelines, without recognizing the
shared background and experiences of many women offenders in our
society, is destined to foster inequity.
X. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Guidelines claim to be gender-neutral, but in reality
they work great harm to women whose lives reflect typical gender roles
and expectations. Gender bias cannot be eliminated as a factor in sen-
tencing merely by legislating gender neutrality. This approach overlooks
527. 883 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1989).
528. Id. at 966.
529. Cf United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1991). In Sabatino, the wife
received a four-level enhancement for having a leading role in her husband's conspir-
acy to violate the Mann Act. Id. at 101. As a former prostitute, she had an active
role interviewing new prostitutes, calling American Express to complete credit card
transactions, and discussing problems with hired prostitutes. Id. at 97-98.
530. Ann C, Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
LJ. 1373, 1394 (1986).
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the ways in which gender impacts criminality and sentencing. At a mini-
mum, gender effects must be evaluated rather than simply ,ignored. In
particular, the treatment of family responsibilities by the Guidelines is
highly detrimental to children of single mothers. To the extent that Cir-
cuits are not permitting departures to single mothers, the Guidelines
should be modified to require departures for single parents unless good
cause exists for denial. Primary parenting responsibilities and pregnancy
should also be grounds for a discretionary departure.
More attention should be paid in the Guidelines' structure to physical
and mental abuse of female offenders who engage in crime. In addition,
questions concerning women's roles as facilitators of criminal activity
needs further study. In other words, issues of victimization and social-
ization of women need to be addressed in Guidelines sentencing. Merely
equating males and females in the Guidelines structure frustrates any at-
tempt to create a rational sentencing policy for women.
Further, it is incorrect to assume that policy enacted to eliminate ra-
cial or class bias in sentencing will help women. The relationships dis-
counted by the Guidelines to avoid disparity in sentencing males who are
poor, unemployed, or members of a minority group are the very relation-
ships that are key in defining traditional female gender roles and expec-
tations. As a practical matter, women have been disadvantaged by being
blended into the Guidelines equation without paying any attention to
gender effects. Ultimately, the gender neutrality of the Guidelines has
worked to produce gender bias in sentencing females.
Ideally, a federal task force is needed to provide a rational sentencing
policy for female offenders. This should include representation from the
Justice Department, Defense Bar, Judiciary, Sentencing Commission,
Bureau of 'Prisons, Probation Office and social service agencies as well
as criminologists and those who have studied family based prisoner is-
sues. Such a task force would focus on all of the gender issues that af-
fect the sentencing and imprisonment of women. Canada established a
Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women which issued a report in 1990
focusing on incarceration."' Given the Guidelines' regime, which limits
judicial discretion to sentence women to nonincarcerative alternatives, in
the United States a broader task force framework is necessary to include
sentencing issues. For too long women have been boxed in by a Guide-
lines structure dominated by visions of male criminality. It is time that
531. See Jane Miller-Ashton, Canada's Female Offenders, 3 FED. PRISONS J. 63, 63-68
(1992).
the gender realities that define the lives of many female offenders are
integrated into the assumptions underlying the Guidelines. In addition, a
uniform approach should be developed for establishing alternatives to
imprisonment and programs within prisons that foster family ties. Final-
ly, it is clear that mandatory minimum penalties frustrate any attempt to
create a truly rational sentencing policy for females and give prosecutors
almost unreviewable power to plea bargain in a manner that can disad-
vantage women because of their gender roles. Substantial assistance
should not depend on fortuity when women's roles in conspiracies oper-
ate in a gendered way to prevent them from obtaining the only departure
that offers a sentence below the mandatory minimum. Unfair gender
effects can now be added to the long list of reasons to abolish mandato-
ry minimums.
